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ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF WAR.

ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF WAR,

AND

A DEFENCE OF THE COMMUNE.

27630

BY THE

RIGHT HON. LORD ROBERT MONTAGU M.P.

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PREFACE.

THE following articles appeared, towards the end of last year, in a London weekly newspaper. The republication of them, with the author's name, will, in this time and country, be sure to injure his prospects, but may benefit a few readers.

The following paragraphs from the *Times* will serve to show both the interest which is taken in the question, and the wrong end to which that interest is turned:

THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION MOVEMENT.—The annual general meeting of the Workmen's Peace Association was held last evening at their rooms, Buckingham-street, Strand, when the chair was taken by Mr. Edmond Beales, M.A., president of the society. The secretary stated that many of the country delegates had reported that, while there was a wide-spread desire in the country for the establishment of a High Court of Nations, composed of representatives from each nation, to settle international disputes by arbitration, and also a strong determination to support Mr. Henry Richard's forthcoming motion in the House of Commons for that purpose, yet there was a large number of per-

sons throughout the country who strongly objected to that part of the society's programme which desires the abolition of all standing armies. There was, therefore, a very general opinion that it would be advisable to defer that part of the programme until some future period.—*Times*, January 5, 1872.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.—The appointment of international arbitrators, to meet at Geneva under the terms of the recent Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, is exciting much interest on the Continent. In Spain Señor Marcoartu, a member of the Cortes, has given notice of his intention to introduce a motion very similar in its nature to that which will shortly be brought before the English House of Commons by Mr. Henry Richard. In Sweden also a member of the Legislature (M. Hedlund) has recently spoken and written much on the same subject. In France it is being discussed with much ability in some of the public journals; and a new society for the promotion of international arbitration is being founded under the presidency of M. Marbau. In Holland the members of the Dutch Peace League have sent an address to Mr. Henry Richard, expressing their lively interest in his intended motion. That body includes some of the most influential men in Holland. Its president is Herr J. A. Jolles, of the Hague, a jurist of European reputation, and now Minister of Justice for the Netherlands. Among its other leaders are two Councillors of State, Herr P. J. Bachiene and Dr. Bleeker, and the following members of the Dutch Parliament: Herr J. de Bosch Kemper, Dr. Van Eck, Herr Moens, Herr Jonckbloet, and Herr Fransen van de Putte.—*Times*, January 10, 1872.

This volume is introductory to volumes which may at some future time appear, to explain the bases of a Christian policy. The principle of order in the world, which the centurion perceived, is that which the following articles were written to illustrate, and the succeeding volumes will aim at inculcating—'Lord, I am not worthy that Thou shouldest enter under my roof; but say the word, and my servant shall be healed. For I also am a man *subject to authority, and having under me* soldiers. . . . . And Jesus, hearing this, marvelled; and said to them that followed Him, Amen, I say to you I have not found so great faith in Israel.'

ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF WAR.

No. I.

EVERY earnest man, who for the first time studies the Encyclicals and the Allocutions of the Popes, will be amazed to find that each of them in turn has been 'a voice crying in the wilderness' those fundamental truths, concerning society, which men persist in utterly ignoring, and proclaiming from the housetop those social and political ills which afflict us, and the remedies which will assuredly remove them. Every Pope has been a *Vox clamantis in deserto*, crying out when no one will lend an ear and hear him. Yet these ills are the vexed questions which have for centuries been perplexing every Government and nation of the world. Is it not then a matter for wonder that no one will pause to give a moment's thought to the infallible words of the visible Head of Christ's Church? It is not that his words are unknown, or pass by without attracting attention. The Syllabus, for example, incensed every one in 1864, and the anger which was then kindled has not yet, in the space of seven years,

subsided. It is not for want of hearing; it is that men will not study those infallible judgments. Even Catholics do not give to them a sufficient attention; while they deliver opinions at their dinner tables in the very words of the errors to which the Syllabus has subjoined anathemas. 'I have a controversy with my people.' What is the crime with which God charged His people? 'My people will not consider, and Israel will not understand.' Every Pope has uttered an unheeded voice; even Pius IX. has not secured attention, although he summoned a Council to consider, 'in order that the whole society of Europe might not fall into ruin.' The men of Nineveh listened to Jonas, and a greater man than Jonas is here. Some Sadducees and Pharisees heard St. John the Baptist; yet the nineteenth century turns away from one of the greatest Popes, while he proclaims to men the remedy for the burdens under which they groan, and the evils which so sorely afflict them. All Europe is like that herd of miserable 'antivaccinators,' who are told of a sure and certain prophylactic for a terrible and loathsome disease, and yet refuse themselves to hear, and will not let others come to a knowledge of the truth.

These reflections have been suggested by a consideration of the greatest penalty which visits the human race, namely, war, both external and civil. Frequent allusions have been made to the warnings which the Holy Father has so often raised against the causes of civil war. The Revolution, and Communism with its petroleum politics, have been often condemned by him; and if Paris had but listened to his words, she would have escaped the Gomorrah fire which has plagued her. For external war men have been busy

of late in trying to devise 'a substitute;' while no substitute can be found except that sacred function which the Holy Father so earnestly pleaded in the face of Europe that he might fulfil for the German and French nations. What other 'substitutes' have been devised?

(1.) The views of the Revolution were expressed by Garibaldi in a letter, dated Sept. 27, 1870, to 'My dear Haweis.' He says: 'In the interests of humanity I would fain see England . . . . . take the initiative in the formation of a world-wide Areopagus, and thus put an end to those savage massacres with which at this moment central Europe is cursed. I have sent the following ideas to Berlin and Stockholm, &c.' The ideas are thus stated by him in the letter to Stockholm: 'The United States, England, Scandinavia, France, and Germany, under whose protection all the lesser Powers might range themselves, would form a magnificent basis for this world-wide union; and the deputies of all the monarchies and republics from (*sic*) all the nations in the world should form an Areopagus at Nice, a free city, and could there establish as the first articles of a universal constitution the following: 1st. War between nations an impossibility. 2d. Any difference arising between any of them to be submitted to the Areopagus for pacific adjudication.'

(2.) On the 4th of last July, at Vienna, a dinner was given by the American Minister, at which the representatives of the foreign Powers were present. The dinner seems to have borne the character of a congress of plenipotentiaries. The American Minister, in his speech, expressed a hope that 'the Treaty just concluded between Austria and America would succeed in

preventing wars, by the establishment of courts of arbitration.' Count Beust, in reply, doubted the efficacy of protocols in restraining the natural quarrelsomeness of mankind, and brought forward instances of this from past history. He continued to say that 'practical reflections should lead to a policy which should everywhere most strenuously ward off war by mediation; but hitherto mediation was no more than tolerated, while Courts of Arbitration were rejected.'

(3.) The Social Science Association appointed a committee which gathered the opinions of great statesmen upon the subject, and carefully prepared a report, in which they mention that, before discussing the subject, they 'issued a number of queries to persons of eminence and authority throughout the country.' They acknowledge that it is the question of the 'greatest importance to the welfare of the world,' and acknowledge that hitherto every attempt to settle international disputes has been 'of an occasional and tentative character,' being 'referred to the arbitration of some third party, or to the settlement by Commissioners;' while 'much more frequently wars have been prevented or terminated through the mediation or good offices of some friendly Power,' . . . . . or 'by conferences of the great Powers.' The Committee add: 'But none of these methods can be adopted, except with the consent of all the parties to the dispute. . . . . For these, among other reasons, your Committee have come to the conclusion that it would be highly desirable that an organisation of a permanent character should be created by a general international agreement, empowered to take cognisance of disputes, without waiting until the parties had, in each particular case, mutu-

ally agreed to have the matter so settled.' The scheme they propose is a 'Congress of Nations' that 'should have a permanent [eternal] organisation. It has indeed been suggested [by the Revolution] that the different States of Europe should form a Federation, and constitute themselves into an *International State*, on the model of the United States of America, with an *International* Government and an *international* army.' They consider it 'essential' that the 'sphere of this Congress should embrace all questions which may possibly lead to war;' even justifying such an 'interference between a Government and its subjects' as would apply to the case of the late civil war in America, or to the war in 1780 between England and her American Colonies. 'The Congress should act in a semi-judicial capacity,' by means of 'a Court of Reference, composed of International jurists, and established by the Congress;' to this Court questions are to be referred by the Congress alone; and it is to report only to the Congress. The question then arose, whether the decisions of the Congress should have only a moral authority, or whether they should be supported by force. Those members of the Committee who were in favour of force urged 'that any expression of opinion not backed by force, however weighty the Congress or tribunal from which it might emanate, would be powerless to control Sovereigns and peoples inflamed with angry and ambitious passions; and that if the proposed Congress or tribunal were merely an organ of public opinion, it would probably find great difficulty in holding its own against unofficial competitors . . . . that confidence in the protection of some Congress or tribunal which should be not only just but powerful, is the

only thing which can ever induce nations to reduce their overgrown military and naval armaments; and that the individual interests which at present often hinder the combined action of different States, for the maintenance of peace, or the prevention of injustice, would cease to do so if they could no longer be furthered by independent action.' Those, on the other hand, who were in favour of a simple moral authority, 'argued that a reference to arbitration or mediation must be, by its nature, an appeal from force to reason; that its very object is the avoidance of war; . . . that any agreement for combined action in enforcing decisions would be certain to be defeated by the particular circumstances of the different States at the time when the occasion for such enforcement should arise; that, in certain cases, the united forces of all the States represented by the Congress might be weaker than the forces of the recalcitrant parties; that, whether weaker or stronger, the complications, difficulties, and evils of war, would be tenfold aggravated by bringing so many nations into the contest; and that there would be quite as little guarantee that justice and might should go together, were the Congress to act collectively, as if each nation were left to defend its own rights.' The Committee then explain that the large States should send more deputies to the Congress than small ones, each State being represented according to its size; and farther, that justice is to mean the vote of the majority (an error condemned by the 60th article of the Syllabus, and by the Allocution of June 9, 1862).

(4.) Mr. J. Noble published a pamphlet, entitled *Arbitration and a Congress of Nations*, in which he has so carefully taken up all the ground, that it will be

convenient for us, as well as fair towards him, to regard it as the exponent of those who advocate a different course from us in regard to the prevention of war, and to reply in detail to his arguments.

No. II.

HAVING explained the course advocated by various statesmen and learned men for the prevention of war, let us now turn our attention to the action which belongs to the Church in this matter. All wars are either just or unjust. In regard to criminal wars the action of the Church can hardly be doubted. It is the duty of the Church to censure every criminal act; for *qui tacet assentit.* 'If thou [the watchman] dost not speak to warn the wicked man from his way, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity, but I will require his blood at thy hand.' (Ez. xxxiii. 8.) If the Church is the army of God, of which Christ is the Great Captain; if she is the guardian of truth, and the commissioned teacher of all nations, then she can never be silent in the presence of crime. If this is her duty in respect of the crimes of individuals, much more may she do so in respect of the crimes of Governments and nations. It is for the Church to save the world from criminal wars; and the world can thus be saved if men will only listen to her voice. By criminal wars we do not mean unjust wars only. A just war may be a criminal war. For a just war may be legal or illegal, according as the preliminaries required by international law have or have not been fulfilled; *e.g.* judging and proclaiming the injury inflicted, and giving the enemy the opportunity of preventing blood-

shed by making reparation. It is therefore proper for the Church to denounce both illegal and unjust wars.

When is a war unjust? or rather, in what consists the justice of a war? The right of self-defence (or the right to force others to act towards us with justice) is inherent in every man and every nation. For the rights of a nation are merely the rights of the component individuals. A nation, therefore, may not use force, except to procure justice or to enforce respect to its rights. Every nation has, in short, merely to provide for its own security. A just war is a war which is undertaken with this view; and an unjust war is a war of which the aim has been suggested by some passion—such as a war of aggrandisement, or of conquest, or of revenge. The late war between France and Germany was an example of an unjust war. It is not a question as to which party was the first to declare it, nor which was really the aggressor. It was a war for ambition and conquest between Governments, who adroitly stirred up the passions of the people by the fiction of an insult, succeeded by the comments of newspapers and pamphlets. The war from which it sprang—namely, that which prostrated Austria in 1866—also comes under our definition of an unjust war. The war from which the war of '66 arose—namely, Prussia's aggrandisement by the robbery of Schleswig and Holstein in 1864—was equally unjust. And the war which led to the war of '64—namely, the war of 1859, by which 'Italy' was made, and Austria weakened—was also unjust. For the last half century unjust wars have been the rule, and just wars the exception. For the last half century, moreover, the frequency and magnitude of wars have increased enormously.

Again: there have been complaints, by various politicians, of the outrageous growth of the great States. What is the cause of this? The small States of Europe have been swallowed up by their great neighbours, not because the great States had suffered any wrong, or had any injustice to fear, but because ambition and rapacity inflamed them, and they disregarded law, and did not care to 'keep justice.' The swallowing up of little States has tended doubly to increase war; first, because great States have thus been brought into contact; and, secondly, because the 'united' State has thus been put farther from union than before. In United Germany, Red Republicanism has become more sour; in United Italy, it makes Victor Emmanuel tremble on his throne. The result of the last war has been this: the Prussian and French armaments have been increased; English arsenals have redoubled their activity; Russia is fortifying and obtaining offensive weapons; while Austria has increased her army from 650,000 men to 800,000 men. Increased taxation has, therefore, been imposed, and this has bred discontent; and the injustice of the war has sown seeds of hatred and implacable revenge. The effect of unjust wars has been the increase of seditions and wars.

In order to devise a remedy, let us consider the cause. Such acts can be done, simply because men have ceased to regard law, and the sense of right has faded from their consciences. The only remedy is to welcome that action which the Church was instituted to exert. Unjust wars must cease as soon as men come to believe the Catechism of the Council of Trent,*

* 'In like manner neither do they sin, who, actuated not by motives of cupidity or cruelty, but by the sole desire of pro-

and feel that to kill is murder, unless when it is necessary for self-defence to slay; and that murder does not cease to be murder by repetition, nor lose its essential character when multiplied by 100,000. If each nation, or its Government, would hear the voice of the Church in this matter, an unjust war could not take place; because then no nation would fight unless a definite injury had been received, and redress had been refused by the aggressor. Before a nation commits a wrong, the intention to commit it must have arisen in the mind of its chief minister. Some end must have been contemplated and desired by him; and then he must have devised the criminal act as a means to that end. But the minister alone cannot carry the criminal intention into effect. He must first succeed in getting the

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moting the public good, take away the life of the enemy IN A JUST WAR.' (Catechism of the Council of Trent, iii. ch. viii. q. 5.)

Again: 'But to no one is it lawful to slay on private authority. For, as regards those who kill, no one is excepted, not the rich, not the powerful, not masters, not parents; but to all, without distinction or difference of any sort, it is forbidden to kill.' (Ibid. q. 9.) Yet Lord Palmerston excused his Government for its numerous wars, by saying that any consul might order an act of hostility to be committed, and thus begin the war without the sanction of the Sovereign; and he gave, as examples, one of the Chinese wars, and if we recollect rightly, the bombardment of Jeddo. These were wars 'on private authority.'

Again: 'But if we attend to the various modes of killing, no one is excepted; for not only is it not lawful for any one to take away a man's life by laying violent hands on him, by using a sword, or a stone, or a stick, or a halter, or poison; but it is absolutely prohibited that it be done by *counsel, aid, assistance*, or any other means.' (Ibid. q. 11.)

many to agree to the act and to applaud it. If the nation does this it becomes equally guilty. The voice of the Church in denouncing the act may therefore prevent its perpetration; for if either the minister or the people pauses to hear and consider, if either of them determines to observe the law and respect right, then the crime of an *unjust* war becomes impossible.

An objection has been urged: 'One nation cannot act lawfully while other nations resort to injustice.' Why can it not? Does a man say this of himself in his private life? Does he urge that he, in self-defence, has become a scoundrel because he perceives that he is surrounded by knaves? The objection is the opposite to the truth. Respect for law must save the nation, for it is the disregard of justice which is its ruin. Let us suppose that the diplomatists who dispose of the affairs of nations care for neither justice nor truth (for the hypothesis is that other nations resort to injustice); every nation must, in that case, lie at the mercy of the most acute diplomatist, or the cleverest trickster, who can twist the other diplomatists round his finger, whether they be in a Congress or in a drawing-room. This one astute man will thus, in fact, dispose of other nations so as to make them subservient to the interests of his own nation; but if one nation resolutely stands to the law, and doggedly adheres to the rule of right, then it cannot become the tool of any foreign power, and thus it stops the course of iniquitous intrigue.

An *unjust* war is therefore the symptom of a deep-seated disease—the sign of an internal cancer, which corrodes the vitals of a nation. It proves that the nation has discarded the Decalogue; it shows that its King has 'stood up, and its rulers have met together

against the Lord, and against His Christ; saying: Let us break their bonds asunder, and let us cast away their yoke from us.' For, since nations are men, there is not one law for nations and another for men. The law of God is the law over all; and if all obey the Decalogue no unjust wars can arise. But although the evils of war have been found quite intolerable, yet the law of God, by which they may be avoided, is not remembered, and the warning voice of the Church is not heard. To escape these evils men prefer to try to make another law for themselves; namely, treaties, and precedents in international law. But treaties have no more than a human sanction; and precedents are the records of the unlawful acts which other nations have committed. Such laws shift when the passions of the strongest nation cause it to desire a change. And if the Decalogue, which rests on Divine authority, has been set aside, still more will treaties and international law be treated with contempt, and be broken whenever convenience prompts. This effect we saw last year, when Russia declared that she intended no longer to be bound by the Treaty of Paris of 1856; and when Prussia gave notice that she would not observe the Treaty of London of 1866. Treaties and precedents are no more than waste paper, and can never supply the place of the law of God in preventing the occurrence of unjust wars.

No. III.

THE cause of every war is crime; for there must be two to make a fight, and one at least must be in the wrong. But a war is just if it be doubtful on which side the right lies; and this is the very point which the arbitrator has to decide. A war is unjust for that party which is in the wrong; and this is the crime which the judge has to denounce. Hence the cause of every war is crime; while justice is the stable foundation of States, and the only security for peace. It is insecurity, or the want of this security and stable foundation, which causes the yearly growth of armaments and the rapid increase in taxation. Obedience to law, or the sense of right, will therefore reduce armaments and decrease budgets. It is 'the cheap defence of nations.'

How is this to be brought about? There is only one way to attain the end. Violent attempts have before now been made to reduce armaments by means of various Peace Associations. Lord Clarendon did his best to devise a new way, and to 'lay another foundation.' The answer to these attempts has been a more rapid succession of unjust wars. The Church of Christ is the only way to the end in view. She was instituted in order to raise men from their degradation, to inculcate the sense of right, and to induce men to live under law and rule; while the tendency of the world, the flesh, and the Devil is to obliterate the sense of

right, to degrade men, to make them set law and rule at naught, and to revolt against every restraint.

It is, of course, the same with nations as with men. Garrotters and burglars a few years ago roamed about London; and no one felt in security although every one went armed in the streets of the Metropolis. Why was this? Because law was set at naught. As a sense of insecurity in regard to the acts of other nations causes an increase of armaments, so the disregard of law in London has caused the number of police to be largely augmented, and the police rate to be proportionately raised. In Ireland there was insecurity because the law was not respected; capital ceased to be invested, and we had to increase expenditure in order to enforce an obedience to law. Disregard of law, a loss of the sense of right, is the cause of insecurity; and insecurity causes expenditure and renders necessary a resort to brute force. Spiritual authority, or else material force, are the only alternatives.

How then can a regard for law and right be instilled? We are not alluding to the training of the young by means of a religious education; the question is as to our action on nations. In the affairs of nations we must proceed to do that which we accomplish in regard to burglars, or to persons who have been apprehended in a street fight. In the latter case a judge determines what right there is on the side of each combatant, and makes his award accordingly. Why, then, in the moral and legal questions between nations should there not be a judge, who shall be beyond the reach of local and political influences; so that independently of the ambition of Kings and the raging passions of peoples, the moral law may shine with a steady light,

like that which is maintained to guide the mariner on the tossing sea? It has, indeed, shone unchanged across centuries of troubled history; but men have turned a blind eye, or it would have more often prevented judgment from being prostituted to justify the conduct of Parliaments and the passions of rulers. '*Vita erat lux hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebræ eam non comprehenderunt.*' No mere temporal State can fill this office of judge; for every State has worldly interests in view as its ultimate end, and employs material force and coercion as its means. But the Church has spiritual good,—the improvement of men, and thereby the glory of God,—as her end; while she employs 'the wisdom of the serpent and the harmlessness of the dove as her means.' The instruments of the State are police and armies,—internal and external war; the instruments of the Church are spiritual; they are metaphysical, moral, and religious. The cure for all the evils of war is that such an authority—an authority which bears a sway in every State of the world—should judge the right and wrong of every quarrel, and should proclaim to the wrongful State, that murder, when multiplied by thousands, does not cease to be murder; that robbery is a worse crime when committed by a nation than when perpetrated by a ragged pickpocket or a starving sharper; that to lie or to bear false witness—whether in Parliament, or in diplomatic notes, or by Reuter's telegrams, or by newspaper articles—is worse, both in extent and in consequences, than when perpetrated in a drawing-room, or uttered over a counter. It is the Church alone which can remedy the evil.

Is the Church of England fit for the task? No: in that Body preferment comes from the Prime Minister,

and the Church is practically bound hand and foot by the State. It cannot venture to rebuke the State. Even if it could denounce crime, yet its judgment would affect Englishmen only;—nay, not a moiety of Englishmen. It could never touch the enemy, for it does not extend beyond its own mountains and seas. But the Catholic Church is everywhere; for she is Catholic,—she is *ultramontane*. She is always on both sides of every quarrel, and is implicated, by some of her children, in every fight. But she, consequently, is impartial; and her voice can command her soldiers in the armies of both combatants, and her children on both their territories. Pius IX., moreover, can speak with authority; for he alone among all Sovereigns does not stand committed to crime. He has taken no part in unjust wars; he has not been guilty of any robbery of territory; he has never stirred up rebellion in neighbouring States; but has ever denounced sedition, and has excommunicated both Fenians and Revolutionists.

It may be asked: 'What will be the practical benefit of a judgment by the Pope on the justice of a war, and a denunciation of an unjust war?' Let us take, for an example, the case most adverse to our argument. Suppose that England were about to enter upon an unjust war, and that the Pope were to denounce the intended war, the Roman Catholics in Great Britain and Ireland, and in the Colonies, believing in the Infallibility of the Pope in questions of morals, would protest as one man against the war. The Roman Catholic soldiers and sailors would refuse to take part in it. A vast number of right-thinking Protestants would join in decrying the war; and then, let us ask,

what Minister would dare to proceed? Such a serious obstacle would at least arrest attention, occasion a pause for thought, and allay irritation of temper. What would be the result of even such a partial effect? Let Earl Russell answer: 'On looking at *all* the wars which have been carried on *during the last century*, and examining into the causes of them, I do not see one of these wars in which, if there had been *proper temper* between the parties, the questions in dispute might not have been settled without recourse to arms.' Leibnitz, another Protestant, wrote (*Op.* tom. v. p. 65): 'I am of opinion that there should be established at Rome itself a high tribunal for judging the quarrels of princes, and that the Pope should be the President of it.' Chancellor Kent (*Commentaries on American Law*, vol. i. lecture i. p. 9; and see also the Preface to the third American edition of Wheaton's *International Law*) alludes in the following terms to the exercise of this very function by the Pope:

'There were five institutions existing about the period of the eleventh century, which made a deep impression upon Europe, and contributed, in a very essential degree, to improve the law of nations. . . . . Of all these causes, the most weight is to be attributed to the intimate alliance of the Great Powers as one Christian community. . . . . The history of Europe, during the early periods of modern history, abounds with interesting and strong cases, to show the authority of the Church over turbulent princes and fierce warriors, and the effect of that authority in ameliorating manners, checking violence, and introducing a system of morals which inculcated peace, moderation, and justice. The Church had its Councils, or convocations

of the clergy, which formed the nations professing Christianity, into a connection resembling a federal alliance; and those Councils sometimes settled the titles and claims of princes, and regulated the temporal affairs of the Christian powers. The confederacy of the Christian nations was bound together by a sense of common duty and interest in respect of the rest of mankind.'

To acknowledge, even in these days, that High Justiciary could not be without great results upon the future of the world. For when even a secular power stands forth, preëminent for justice, the weaker powers, in all parts of the world, seek its counsel, and fly to it for succour. Such a High Justiciary, then, would influence, not only its own spiritual subjects, but would gain also the hearts of those in all countries, who can see what is right; it would extend its empire over the hearts of all just men. For empire rests on men's minds, not on material force. If a Government is just, then towards it will be the sympathies of men; and when a Government is harsh and rapacious, even its former supporters will turn against it. For justice is the basis of Empire and the strength of States. The justice of the Pope's judgments would be an extension of his Empire over all States; while the injustice of the acts of European Governments would alienate from them even their own subjects. The power would be to the judge.

No. IV.

HAVING considered the remedy for criminal wars, let us now turn our attention to the means of obviating the evils of just and legal wars. It may, indeed, be said that the remedy against unjust wars must, if successful, prevent all wars; because one combatant at least must be fighting unjustly. Yet both parties may imagine that the justice is on their side, and hold that the solemn denunciations against an unjust war will not fall upon them. Let us then look at such a case. But first, it will be acknowledged that, except in self-defence, it is never the pecuniary interest of any nation to go to war. Take the late Abyssinian war for an example: it cost us eight or nine millions sterling to liberate six persons who had been imprisoned for breaking the laws of the land. Yet we might have bought them of King Theodore at a hundredth part of the price; or indeed he would have been glad to get rid of them without any return, if we could have promised that he would have been rid of them for ever. The war was therefore, in any event, a certain pecuniary loss to the country. The war between France and Prussia was also detrimental to both countries; even Prussia has lost more than the enormous indemnity and the 'Union' of Germany can ever repay her. The loss of life, on both sides, has been so great that both nations must for years remain prostrate; the misery which has been inflicted, and the stoppage of industry,

will grievously afflict both nations for years to come. And, if the single victory of Waterloo filled the French with revengeful feelings, which have lasted more than half a century, and caused hundreds of millions of money to be wasted during that time in increased appliances for war, will not the series of victories, the requisitions, the plunderings, the bombardments, the fusillades, and the conflagrations perpetrated by the Prussians, cause the most angry feelings and bitter hatreds to burn in the breasts of the French for a hundred years? Will not armaments and taxation be increased, in eager rivalry, on both sides, until the day of dire retribution shall arrive? Not alone these two nations will be affected. The armies of all other nations have already become more vast, and each one burns with eagerness to be first in the race of death and ruin, and to be superior in material force to all the others. For every country is jealous and suspicious of every other country; and this is the *rationale* of 'the balance of power in Europe.' Yet each nation confesses that such an armed peace is ruinous to every nation, and that war is a grievous disadvantage to all those who engage in it.

The following are the words of Mr. Noble (*Arbitration, and a Congress of Nations*, 1862, p. 7):

'An appeal to military power is rendered the almost sole alternative in national disputes. With these potent means of destruction in their hands, the Governments of the world have not appealed to the arbitrament of reason and justice in the settlement of their disputes, but have been ever too ready to rush into wars for the double purpose of asserting their own supremacy, and securing the humiliation of their enemies.

Law, justice, and reason have been alike dethroned, and man, whose highest prerogative it is to be guided by their influence, has acted like a beast of prey. The influence of war has also been most disastrous upon civil liberty, resulting, as it has almost invariably done, in the creation of vast military despotisms, under whose blighting influence the liberties of free nations have disappeared, and been replaced by hopeless, grinding tyranny. In every point of view, whether affecting the social condition, the material prosperity, or the civil liberty of nations, war is an unmitigated curse. Upon the religious character of nations it has also exercised a deep and wide-spread influence for evil. Christianity, the messenger of peace and goodwill to men, whose empire is based upon the moral sentiments alone, whose mission it is to teach that all men are brethren, has been made to pander to and support this monster evil. The religious faculty in man has led him, in all ages, to seek a religious sanction for his actions; hence we find in heathen mythologies a god of war whose aid was invoked on behalf of his worshippers. . . The new religion taught its disciples to "love your enemies; bless them that curse you, and pray for them that despitefully use you." Strange that this beneficent faith should have been so perverted that professed Christian ministers have not hesitated to consecrate the banners of the warrior, and to implore the blessing of the Divine Father of all men upon his barbarous and bloody work; strange that the Cross, the symbol of redeeming grace, and of patient long-suffering and meekness, should be emblazoned on the ensigns of hosts trained for purposes of slaughter and revenge; strange that professedly Christian Go-

vernments do not hesitate to embark in the most unprovoked wars, and wage them with a determination and ferocity worthy of the barbarous worshippers of Pagan, Saxon, or Roman gods!'

It is plain, however, that there cannot be a general disarmament of nations, unless a Court of Arbitration can be substituted for the 'bloody arbitrament' of war. If disputes are not to be settled by arms, other means must be found for deciding them when they arise. If we are to avoid fighting, there must be an appeal to some court which shall be without interest in the decision, or bias in the judgment; a court whose justice cannot be suspected, and whose moral perception and legal acumen cannot be doubted. The Secular Powers of Europe envy each other, and must necessarily be interested in the decision. These Powers may therefore appear before the court, *as interested parties*, by means of their advocates; but, as interested parties, they must none of them be parties to the judgment.

We are devising a substitute for war. Let us therefore ask ourselves for what end war is undertaken. For, as war is not a good thing in itself, it must always have been undertaken as means to an end. We think that the means were bad; and we say that, if we keep the end clearly before our minds, we may find better means, and point to a more excellent way. What then has been the end and aim of war? To obtain a right settlement to a dispute. Does war then obtain a right settlement? Does it even approach the determination of any question upon a just basis? Duelling was, at one time, used as the means of settling a dispute between two men. It was called 'the bloody arbitrament,' or 'trial by wager of battle.' The practice was

defended on the ground that it was a direct appeal to God to judge the justice of the quarrel. But duelling is not now practised; it is even forbidden, on the ground that the dispute is not thereby settled on the basis of justice and right, and that nothing is determined except the question who is the better pistol-shot or the more accomplished swordsman. So with nations: a war does not lead to a just settlement of the dispute; it merely proves who can bring up the greatest number of soldiers, in the shortest time, and kill the greatest number of enemies. Every other question is forgotten as soon as the war begins. No one, amid the reëchoes of artillery, and the sulphurous canopy of the battle-field, pauses to canvass the origin, the aim, or the justice of the quarrel; no one even considers, for a moment, the proper means to the attainment of the end which the nation may have in view. When war has been declared, nothing is thought of but getting ready plenty of powder and shot, torpedoes and mitrailleuses, and slaughtering as many fellow-Christians as possible. Is war, then, an appeal to reason, to justice, to law? No. Is it an appeal to the God of Battles? No nation regards it as such; no one commences it with the feeling that the Everlasting Judge, the Ancient of Days, is being appealed to; and no one accepts defeat as a decision by the Judge of all the earth. Then how can war ever settle a question of difference between nations? So far from it, that the moment war is begun, law and justice are set aside, and the ruling maxim is: 'Everything is fair in war.' Thus Mr. Noble says: 'War is, moreover, incapable of determining a single point in dispute; it cannot prove which party is right; it cannot discriminate and show in *what*

points each is right and each is wrong; it can merely prove which nation is the stronger, which has the larger number of men, the most scientific warlike appliances, or the most material resources. When one or both parties are exhausted, not a single point has been gained towards the settlement of the matter in question; negotiation then succeeds to slaughter, and the differences are terminated either between the contending nations themselves, or by the assistance of their neighbours.'

No. V.

We have shown that war, except in self-defence, is the most irrational course which a country can take; that both parties get punished more severely than for any other act which the nation can commit; that both combatants become crippled for many years by the loss of men and money, and the dislocation of trade, and the cessation of agriculture, and the stoppage of manufactories. Worse than all, their ideas of right and wrong become confused, through the passions which are engendered, and they know it not. A war is a far more irrational act than duelling; and yet duelling has been put down by common consent and the substitution of a court of law. The alternative for war, likewise, is the judgment of a supreme court of arbitration.

The preliminary objection which will be raised is that this is 'impracticable.' 'How can arbitration be substituted for war?' Such an objection is a tacit admission that the thing itself is essentially good. When a thing is evil, the proposal is met by showing the evil. Impracticability is never urged as an objection against an evil thing. The question, therefore, which remains, is whether it can be carried into practice. A court consisting of the representatives of all the interested parties (such as Mr. Noble proposes) will certainly be useless and impracticable; for this is a proposal that the litigants should be the judges. Such a court would

evidently be far less likely to succeed than that which we propose; yet such a court was solemnly affirmed, as practicable and likely to succeed, in the Treaty of Paris of 1856.

The court of arbitration which is to become a substitute for war must merely hear the advocates of all the interested parties. The judge must be in a position as high and potent as that of a sovereign. He must have at command the utmost learning in the 'law of nations,' that is, the law of God (the Decalogue) as applied to nations; and he must be well practised in casuistry, or the solution of intricate questions in conscience and morals. He must be above suspicion of injustice and unfair dealing; or, in other words, he must not be liable to gain, except in reputation, by the award which he makes. To what court, to what arbiter, does this description point? The Head of the Christian Church is the only one who has all these marks or properties. To what end, indeed, was the first Pope appointed by Christ, and the whole unbroken succession of Popes continued to this day, if not to 'bind or loose on earth that which is to be bound or loosed in heaven'?

Let us look at this from another point of view. Wars are caused by the evil passions of men; by the lust of power, by the envies and suspicions, by the hatreds and desires for revenge which influence nations as much as they do the component individuals. In order to remove the effect you must take away the cause. Take away, then, those evil passions, or at least restrain them. But who is to do this? Is not this the proper work of the Church? She has to Christianise nations as well as men. She was likened by

our Lord to a little leaven in the mass of the world. Not only by the missionary work of the Church will the passions of individual men be calmed, but the direct effect of such a court of arbitration as we have mentioned will be to restrain the passions of nations. Their lust of power will be mortified; their envy and suspicion will be ended; for nothing which a nation can do will influence the decision of the Pope in its favour, or make his judgment subserve its lust for power. And if the lust of power in one nation can find no scope, then other nations will have no cause for envy or suspicion, and there will no more be the memories of defeats to be revenged, nor of pillage and conflagrations to call for reprisals. Is this a Utopian dream? Why, then, did the declaration of Paris declare in favour of a more impracticable court than this? Why did it seek to establish a more Utopian dream as a substitute for war? Why did all the astute diplomatists of Europe put their hands and seals to the declaration, if a still more feasible plan is to be called Utopian? We shall hereafter show that it is not only possible, but also that Europe, for many centuries, enjoyed the blessings of the very court which we now have to plead for.

When the practicability has been conceded, we have to meet this further objection: 'How shall the decisions of such a court be enforced? By what power are its judgments to be carried out?' Power is physical, or moral, or spiritual. If, as Lord Palmerston has said, 'opinion is stronger than armies,'—if as Mazzini and also the Communists have asserted, 'an idea can never be put down by physical force,' then it follows that a moral power is stronger than physical power;

and as spiritual power is stronger than a merely moral power, *à fortiori* it is stronger than physical. By what power are the decisions of the Church now carried out? By her *spiritual* power of binding and loosing, by her power of teaching all nations without chance of error, by her power of excommunication, and her power in the Sacraments. 'Yes, that may do well enough (we are told) for those who believe in her infallibility, who fear excommunication, and seek grace through the Sacraments; but how will she thus exert a coercive power over others?' By what power are the decisions of courts of law carried out? By the *moral* power in a declaration of what is just; or the moral power in a statement of the provisions and requirements of a law of the land, even when that law happens to be unjust. This is a power which cannot be resisted by those who feel a just judgment to be binding, and those who acknowledge the force of a statute of the realm.

'But a court of law has police and soldiery to support its decisions.' Unless the majority of persons support the law, and acknowledge the force of justice, and recognise truth when they hear it, neither police nor soldiery would be of any avail. You cannot cut the throats of a mob, nor shoot them down by thousands with soldiery, nor even quell them with a policeman's truncheon. You can but awe them with the authority of law, and quell them by words of truth and justice. If the nation is against you, police and soldiery will not avail you. When the barons of old, clad in mail, roved about committing depredations, and lawlessly taking the field against each other, there would have been much more ground for saying that a central autho-

rity,—a secular authority, which was unable to do more than pronounce a judgment according to law,—was an impracticable and Utopian dream; for there was no standing army in those days, and the only police were the soldiers of the barons. Yet even then the ecclesiastical authority of Rome quelled whole nations, and bent the imperious wills of Emperors and Kings; while the prelates in each country awed the fierce and lawless barons. Afterwards a secular central authority, by degrees, arose, and quelled the lawlessness and ruled the confusion; and it was respected, although it was itself an interested party; and it was obeyed, although its judgments were sometimes unjust, and seldom enlightened. If this was so in those times, much more would a central authority be respected now, especially if it be spiritual and not secular, just and not partial, enlightened and not rustic. The supremacy of law and the authority of justice never rest upon material force, nor obtain obedience by bodily fear. Still less does a spiritual power depend for support upon the qualities of matter. The one rests on the moral sense and conscience; the other upon the faith and reverence of men. But when the moral sense becomes darkened and the conscience seared; when men forget that they are spiritual beings, and become degraded and brutalised, then indeed is law set at naught, and justice ceases to be honoured, and God is not feared, and His voice is unheard, and anarchy and revolution ensue—in spite of the police and soldiery and sources of material power which may have been prepared. It is in order to stop war, and anarchy, and revolution, which defy material force, that the world must acknowledge the judgments of the Head of the Church, and his de-

cisions on the claims of Governments and acts of nations. The more just those judgments are, the less will they require the support of armies; for the more reverence they will obtain in the hearts of men.

Even if they could be unjust, still armies would not be needed. Let us ask ourselves how we proceed when the Legislature in this country passes unjust enactments, and makes statutes that are not true declarations of law. Do we not appeal to the moral sense of mankind, and demand our rights in the name of justice? Then there is a moral sense, even though it be darkened; and there is a power in justice, although it be denied, which is sufficiently strong to enforce right judgments without the assistance of material weapons. 'Opinion is stronger than armies;' and just judgment is stronger than opinion; and spiritual authority is more powerful than either. The strength, therefore, of the judgments of the Pope, on the claims and acts of the nations of the world, will depend on the laborious investigations previously undertaken, and the patent justice of the ultimate award. If the justice is once clearly seen, and the patient consideration becomes known, redress will never more be sought by violent means, but will always be demanded of the sacred tribunal. Every country has established for itself a secular substitute for violence within its own borders, and has succeeded in quelling the habits of lawlessness which once were prevalent. Let this be done by the Church for the comity of nations, and from the same cause the same result should follow. A great nation is so many men; and every act of a nation is first devised in the head of one man. Then why should not the sovereignty of Law and Right, when pronounced by

the highest, and that a spiritual authority, be as potent in putting down disunion and violence between nations, as now, when pronounced in a kingdom by a secular judge who represents the sovereignty of law in that kingdom, it is potent in preventing disunion and violence between men? Surely it is fitting that the Vice-regent of Him who said, 'My peace I give unto you,' should be the means of promoting unity and concord in the world.

No. VI.

A PRELIMINARY objection has been urged, which does not really touch the question which we have been considering. 'The vast armaments of Europe,' it has been recklessly asserted, 'are kept up merely as a means of enforcing justice.' But if it be true that justice is the end in view when armaments are increased, then it has been made clear by the event, that they are not the proper means to the desired end. When an army has been made powerful, it has ever been used for unjust aggression; and when an army is small and weak, it cannot prevent injustice. Therefore, whether an army be weak or strong, injustice is still perpetrated on the earth; and armies are, in no sense, a means to justice.

Even in the best case, both parties imagine that what they are enforcing is just; while one of them, at least, must be using his armies to enforce injustice. If to know and to do what is just be really the end and aim of all nations, then let them arrive at that knowledge by rational means, and not act without previously knowing what action would be right and lawful.

We are told that: 'It is true that the war ends by proving merely which of the combatants has the biggest battalions; but when one party is exhausted, then the representatives of the various Powers of Europe usually meet and decide.' What do they decide? They do not simply decide what is just. They then find out, by the result, which nation has the most cunningly

devised policy, and the shrewdest and most wily representative at the Congress; or, perhaps, they are all beguiled by him, without finding it out. For that country outwits each of the others; so that, the horrors of war having been survived, the burdens of an unjust settlement have, for many years, to be endured. In course of time, the injustice of the burden causes that settlement to be defied, and then another war, as hideous and sanguinary, is begun.

If, on the other hand, it is pretended that a Congress can and does always decide justly, then we retort that the Congress should prevent the war instead of coming after it. But a Congress never can judge justly, for passions are involved in the judgment, and the cleverest diplomatist outwits the remaining judges, so that every nation secretly feels, when too late, that the decision of the Congress has been flagrantly unjust; and each nation remembers, for years, that the judgment has been arrived at by the advocates of the various powers—after they have spent a considerable time in bamboozlement and intrigue—and not by a judge who has remained in the altitudes of calm and passionless deliberation, far above the noisy storms of controversy; who has sought counsel and assistance from above, by meditations and pious contemplations, and not from below, in the turbid channels of 'Public Opinion'; whose interest is nil; whose intelligence and learning are profound; and whose morality is pure and above reproach.

The ancient world had its Amphictyonic Council; a supreme court which judged the differences that arose among the confederated Republics of Greece. It existed and judged, and its judgments were respected.

For centuries it did much to preserve the well-being of Greece. But Philip of Macedon, aiming at universal power, saw that this council stood in the way of his conquests. Acting on the maxim of *Divide et impera*, he intrigued, and caused its fall. There has also been the Teutonic League; and there has been the Helvetic Union. These were leagues of independent States, with a common diet. There is also the Supreme Court over all the States of America, which, until lately, has been just and respected. 'But,' we are told, 'all these courts have failed at last.' Why have they failed? Because the judges were the advocates,—the representatives of the interested and litigant powers. Yet even these courts, badly formed as they were, lasted a long time, and did good service. But let a really supreme court be constituted, or rather acknowledged; and let every government apply to itself those maxims of law which it considers binding upon every man and every society of men, viz.: 'It is criminal to employ force against another, except in defence of one's own life;' and, 'not a duel, but a legal judgment is to determine every dispute;'—let this be done, and then 'swords will be beaten into ploughshares, and spears will be turned into pruning hooks,' and cannons into church bells. Nations will then vie with one another, not in increase of armaments, but in presenting a juster cause for judgment. Then the burdens which press upon the people will be lightened; their passions will be calmed, and every one, now a soldier, will have to work at some productive employment, and be a benefit to his fellow men. These will be the results if we 'seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness.' If we seek the kingdom of God!

Those principles on which alone a society can stand apply, of course, as much to national as to international politics. Cicero, in his Dissertation on the State, thus defines the term: '*Quid enim est civitas, nisi juris societas?* What else does the word *State* denote, than a society founded on the pursuit of right?' Again he said, '*Religio est humanæ societatis fundamentum;* Religion is the foundation of every human society;' not a false religion of course, but the one true religion; for nothing can stand upon falsehood. '*La justice constituée, c'est l'Etat,*' said Victor Cousin (*Cours d'Hist. Phil.* p. 14). But how can you constitute justice without a supreme Judge, from whose judgment there is no further appeal? How can you know that true religion, which is the only solid basis of every human society, without a Church which is an authoritative teacher of nations and guardian of the truth? For the durable existence of every State, and for the harmonious relations of all States, it is equally necessary that the Head of the Church of Christ should be acknowledged as the Supreme Arbiter and the Infallible Judge in all moral questions.

In regard to separate States let us consider the following points. By moral power, that is, by the sense of right alone, can a State be governed. Force can restrain, not govern. A despot's commands may for a time be enforced, but they can be of no avail to the nation: they can but create confusion, unless they are in accordance with the Moral Law and the Christian Faith. The same is true of a representative polity. The art of government does not consist in the manufacture of majorities. Statesmanship is not dexterity in guile. To baffle a faction is not an exploit of wis-

dom. No; the statutes which are passed must express the sense of right to which every conscience would bear witness, were it not buried under a superincumbent mass of false notions. The question for the statesman, therefore, is how the nation may know, from the mouth of some supreme and unerring authority, when their statutes are contrary to the laws of God or eternal right; and how the sense of right may be strengthened throughout the nation; or, rather, how it can be relieved from the superincumbent fallacies. Statutes of the realm cannot improve the moral feeling; they can, at best, but restrain from open acts of crime. To improve the sense of right in the nation, and to rebuke the fallacies which the nation accepts, are functions of the Church. For she was instituted to make disciples of all nations, and to teach them to observe the law of Christ.

Coleridge was so much imbued with this idea of the Church, that he never stopped to argue about it, but simply assumed it as self-evident. He regarded all political evils as nothing but moral evils, or crimes against the law of God. He enumerated the evils, or rather the complaints, which were commonly heard in his day, from persons of opposite views, thus: 'The poorer classes are not fit to be trusted with power;' 'the aristocracy are disposed to maintain abuses;' 'the working classes are improvident;' 'the trading classes care for nothing but material wealth;' 'the higher classes are selfish and cold.' These facts were bandied about as the causes of the political ills. To these all the miseries of the country were ascribed. Yet the cause of all is undoubtedly moral. Untrustworthy or unfaithful, dishonest, improvident, sordid, selfish; all these

words refer to conduct and character; they all denote that men set their hearts on something which is not really good. There is, as we may say, a moral cause for every political evil; a moral defect rather. To remedy such defects the Church was established by Christ.

This may be learnt from history, whether sacred or profane. Again: the whole drift of the Bible, whether we take Numbers, Judges, Jeremias, or Isaias (which Coleridge called the statesman's manual), is to show that what appear to be political evils are really only moral evils. Milton thus expresses this truth: he is speaking—as a Jew—concerning modern statesmen:

> 'But, herein, to our prophets far beneath,
> As men divinely taught, and better teaching
> The solid rules of civil government,
> In their majestic, unaffected style,
> Than all the oratory of Greece or Rome.
> In them is plainest taught, and easiest learnt,
> What makes a nation happy, and keeps it so;
> What ruins kingdoms, and lays cities flat.'

Is it not, then, the office of the Church—an office which nothing but the Church can perform—to fill up these moral defects, and correct the prevalent errors in each nation? It has unremittingly to testify to the historical fact that 'righteousness exalteth a nation;' that universal cheapness is not *the* good thing; that supply and demand—those false gods of modern days—are not the source of strength; that union or peace constitutes power, while selfishness is the universal solvent of nations; that not expediency, but right, is the rule for governments. A king we have to resist by force the passions of men; but the Church is there

to induce men to repress their own evil passions. The power, moreover, which every one contributes to support the king is the sense of duty which is in the subject's breast; and when that sense of duty becomes bleared, the king loses his authority. The king's throne, therefore, no less than the welfare of the nation, stands upon the work of the Church. Yet both kings and people think it convenient to forget justice and push right aside; and at the same time they strip religion of its godliness in their minds. Politics then become unscrupulous intrigue; and their religion becomes a spiritless, fruitless negation—a mere profession of human opinions without corresponding acts. Thus begins the decadence of every nation, and the era of anarchy, seditions, tumults, and revolutions, which are the symptoms of the internal disease. For this corruption of the State the remedy lies in that infallible teacher of nations, of whose predecessors our Lord said, 'Ye are the salt of the earth.' That this high justiciary is for the healing of individual nations will perhaps hardly be gainsaid; in our next number we shall attempt to show that he is equally set up for the good of the comity of nations. But lest what we have already said may appear to be the dreams of a too fervent Catholic, we will quote the words of a Protestant—a statesman, poet, and historian—a bitter enemy not only of the Catholic Church, but also of the Church of England. But he lived two centuries nearer to the Middle Ages, at a time when men had not yet been so utterly misled as to the true character of that period. Milton wrote (A.D. 1641), in his *History of the Reformation of England:* 'There is no art that hath been more cankered in her principles, more soiled and slubbered with aphorisming

pedantry, than the art of policy ; and that most where a man should think would least be, in Christian commonwealths. They teach not that to govern well is to train up a nation in true wisdom and virtue—and that which springs from thence, magnanimity (take heed of that)—and that which is our beginning, regeneration, and happiest end, likeness to God, which in one word we call godliness ; and that this is the true flourishing of a land, other things following as the shadow does the substance.'

No. VII.

We shall now consider the necessity of the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, in order that harmonious relations may be maintained between the various States of the civilised world. Our aim is harmony in the society of nations—a unity among all nations. We desire not only to prevent war, but to get rid of the deadly rivalry in armaments and the increase of the means of destruction which is now the policy of every government. Our object is not only peace, but a security for peace in the future. This means that all nations are to form a unity. But unity presupposes a principle or law of unity, and also a centre of unity, or supreme authority over the whole. That much every one must admit; but here is the point at issue: we say that this centre of unity must be in the universal Church—namely, the Head of the Catholic Church; others deny this, but know not where they would place it.

The aim of Mazzini also is to form a unity of all nations; on which ground his society is called the *Alleanza della Reppublica Universale.* He desires that every nation should have a republican form of government, and should be in unity with every other nation, by being held under the supreme authority of one central government, which is also to be of a republican character. Now, the form of government is an accident which does not arise until after our pre-

sent inquiry. The essential part of Mazzini's scheme is that all nations shall be united under one supreme authority.

The aim of the International Society is to break up every nation into Communes or little Republics, which are to determine for themselves all local matters, or, in other words, which are to exercise the most extended powers of self-government. These Communes are to be federated, or united together, by being placed under the authority of a central government, whose only function is to be the declaration of general principles of law,—like the English Privy Council in former days.

Each of these schemes, then, aims at a unity of all the civilised world; so that each has, of necessity, proposed a central government, whose functions are to embrace a larger or smaller sphere of action. From this point we start. The central government is to *govern;* it is to be a sovereign body; it is to be supreme. In other words, there is to be no appeal from the decisions of the central government to any other body. For if there were an appeal, then the sovereignty would lie in that body to which the appeal is made, and the government would really be vested in that body; while the body from which appeal is made would exercise only vicarial or vice-regal functions; it would be merely an agent or instrument of government. The judgments of that body, then, which is to be the centre of unity of the civilised world—or which is to be the sovereign body, or the government of the world—must be absolute and without appeal; for this is meant by its being supreme. In other words, the judgments of that supreme body, in its sphere of action or jurisdiction, are to be regarded as final and accepted

as true. As for the civilised world, in respect of all those subjects which are embraced in the sphère of action of the supreme authority, it will be an absolute monarchy under this sovereign, who is the centre of unity.

'No,' says Mazzini, 'it is to be a Republic.' Let us consider the meaning of the word. A large Republic is a country ruled by a small body of men (who, by some means, have come to that position), and who call themselves 'the Republican Government.' Every government is necessarily a unity, for where there is no unity there is anarchy, or no government. In a Republic the unity consists of a small body of men, who call themselves the Republic. Take the present French Republic, for example: M. Thiers, or else M. Thiers and the man or men who wield the assembly, are the government. This sovereign unity, or government, is the Republic; and all the rest of France is a monarchy under this sovereign. In the old Roman Republic two-thirds of the known world was a monarchy, and the sovereign was the forum. In every case it is this sovereign (whether it be one man alone, or a man with councillors, or what not), which is the centre of unity, or the common government of all. Whether his name be Louis Napoleon, or Thiers, or Thiers in conjunction with other names, or different names in rotation, makes no difference to the matter which we are considering. There is the sovereign; destroy that, and the unity is gone. The 'accidents' of this one body—this sovereign, this centre of unity—do not affect the present question. For it is a subsequent question whether we shall say: The sovereign shall be one man alone (and then it is an ulterior ques-

tion whether the one man shall belong to one particular family—either the eldest, as in England, or the nearest to a line, as in Turkey—or whether he shall be a man of any family chosen by certain electors), it is, we say, a subsequent question, whether we shall say: The sovereign shall be one man standing alone; or, the sovereign shall consist of twelve or thirteen men (who have got to that position by certain means); or, the sovereign shall be one man with the necessary concurrence of councillors; or, the sovereign shall be one man with the concurrence of two assemblies. These are subsequent questions which arise on the consideration of the form of government; but not on the question of government itself.

As Englishmen cannot easily divest themselves of national prejudices, they will still be likely to mix up this subsequent question with the question under consideration, by objecting that there may be a 'limited sovereignty.' This may mean one of two things: either that the man who bears the mantle of royalty is not really the sovereign, because his powers are limited by the other parts of the sovereign body; or else that the man is sovereign, but in a smaller sphere of action, *i.e.* he is supreme in certain matters, while certain other matters are not brought under his cognisance. We still assert, therefore, that sovereignty means unlimited authority throughout the sphere of sovereignty; and that an authority which is limited is not a sovereign authority. When an Englishman speaks of our limited monarchy, he means that the three estates of the realm in combination, are the sovereign body; and that no one of them alone is sovereign.

To recur to the point under consideration, we repeat

that our aim is to see how we may unite all nations; that is, how we may coördinate them in harmony under a sovereign body. We answered Mazzini by saying that his objection about a Republic did not touch the point that we were urging; because a Republic is a monarchy, not under one man, but under a sovereign consisting of a certain number of men; for the whole nation is governed by that sovereign body of men, just as it would be by an Emperor.

'Precisely,' say the Communists; 'and that is why we insist that each town should rule itself, and be a Commune or Republic in itself.' The Communists mean that France, for example, instead of being under one sovereign body, should be broken up into thousands of Republics, each of which is to be under a body of men, which will be its sovereign. But what we have been saying is equally true in this case, only it applies to a smaller area; seeing that each town (instead of the whole country) will be under such a sovereign body. This being so, we proceed farther, and say to the Communists: If France is to be a unity—if she is to be one country, and not merely a geographical expression, then you must have a common government—you must have a sovereign authority over all these Republics; otherwise (as you indeed admit) there cannot be any unity.

Let us now turn from France, and apply the same truth to the whole civilised world; for our object is to constitute a harmony or unity embracing all nations as integral parts. In other words, we have determined to have a principle of unity, and a centre of unity or supreme authority. Let us be careful to remember that the following is a subsequent question, which

must not be allowed to intrude and confuse our present inquiry, namely, What are to be the functions of the supreme government; or, in other words, how many subjects shall its sphere of action embrace? We put it aside for the present. Having determined that there must be a central or supreme government, we shall be asked what this government is to be, or where the sovereignty is to reside. We have already made answer, and said, In the Church; because the Catholic (or Universal) Church embraces all Christian nations as integral parts; therefore the government of the Church must be the source of harmony, the principle of unity, the supreme government in the society of nations; otherwise there will be no unity, but duality, or anarchy and confusion.

We shall then be farther asked: Where, in the Church, is the sovereignty to reside?

(1.) Some have answered: In a Council of the Bishops of the whole Church. But we object that this would be an intermittent sovereignty; and an intermittent sovereignty is a contradiction in terms; it is absurd, and impossible in practice. Besides, we ask, who is to call together a Sovereign Council to decide on the disputes of nations? Who is to preside over it? Who is to dismiss it (for that originator, president, and executioner will go near to be the true sovereign)? Shall a king fulfil these functions? Should a French king then summon the Prussian, Austrian, Italian, Russian, and English Bishops?

(2.) At the time of the Reformation, Luther answered and said: 'This sovereignty, this supreme power, shall be in the people of the Church, and not in the Pope, nor in the aristocracy of Bishops; the Church

shall be a Republic.' But what we have just said of every Republic was soon found to apply in fact; they saw that this 'sacred Republic' was a monarchy under one or more men, who were the real sovereign and exercised the supreme power. Therefore the Puritans, the Albigenses, the Lollards, &c., went a step farther, and, like the Communists, said: 'Each congregation shall be a Republic.' They were therefore called Congregationalists. But such a conglomeration of Republics, if there be not a central government supreme over all, would clearly not serve our present purpose; it could not be a central government and centre of unity for all nations; or, if you were to form a unity of these congregations and have a central government and sovereign authority over them, then they would no longer be independent. On the other hand, without a supreme authority, your million congregations would not be the one universal Church, and would be useless for our purpose.

(3.) If, then, we are to look to the universal Church to do our work, we must find it under the government of one who must be the principle of unity, the centre of action, and supreme. To him must be the appeal in the last resort, and from his decision (within the whole sphere of his authority) there must be no appeal. In other words, we must look for a head of the universal Church who is accepted as right in his judgments, on all questions within his sphere of jurisdiction. We say advisedly that he must be accepted as right in his judgments, or that there must be no appeal from his decision to some other body beyond him; for we do not require, for our present purpose, the theological truth of his infallibility. All we need to argue is, that there

must be some point beyond which no appeal can be carried; that the judge to whom the appeal is carried in the last resort is thereby regarded as right in his judgment; and that it is he who is the supreme authority, and therefore the centre of unity and principle of cohesion between nations.

Putting aside all theological truths, and the force of existing facts, let us consider what we should do if we had a *tabula rasa*, and desired to construct such a principle of cohesion between nations. It is clear that this sovereign must be one man, with absolute authority in all matters within his sphere of jurisdiction. For if we place many men in that position, or if we limit the authority of that one man, by requiring the concurrence of an aristocracy, or of one or more chambers, then there may be a split; the parts may clash; and then one of two things must happen, there must either be a compromise, which is a sacrifice of truth and justice, and therefore fatal to our purpose; or else the unity will be gone, and interminable wars of factions will succeed, and prevent the unity from being brought back again. This supreme authority must therefore be one man; advised indeed by the best and wisest, if you like; and assisted by the learning and research of many; but still the supreme authority and centre of unity must, for our purpose, be one man.

No. VIII.

In our last number we concluded that the centre of unity of the society of nations, or, in other words, the supreme authority over the world, must be one man. An objection, we knew, would arise in the minds of those who are accustomed to look at questions with eyes bleared by the political fallacies of the day. They will have exclaimed: 'But if the supreme authority is to be in the hands of one man, he may abuse his power;' or they may have said in milder tone, that, 'with the best intentions, one man is likely to err.' By 'abusing his power,' they mean that he would act wrongly,—that he would ignore the rights of others, that his conduct would be tyrannical; in other words, they assert, by their objection, that he would transgress the moral law, or the law of God. So, too, when they say that he may err, they must denote by the expression (as we shall plainly see when we come to consider the function or sphere of action of this central authority) an error of judgment in morals. The objections to recognising the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope amount, therefore, to a questioning of the Pope's judgment in questions of morals (for we assume that facts are not in dispute, or, at all events, that they have been correctly laid before him). But the Primacy of the Head of the Church involves his jurisdiction both in government and in doctrine; and the assistance of Infallibility attaches to the jurisdiction of the Head

of the Church in all questions of faith and morals, whether in the form of doctrine or of discipline, and in so far as it extends to faith and morals (although the jurisdiction extends also over many subjects which do not come within his Infallibility). This follows from the fact that our Lord established a Church as the Teacher of all nations—a Catholic Church which was to comprise all nations within her bosom—a Church with whom He was to be 'all days unto the end of the world,' and against whom the gates of Hell should never in the least prevail. Although the man, in his private capacity, may err and sin, yet the Pope, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, cannot err in declaring the moral law.

Let us turn aside for a moment to admire the admirable adaptation of means to end in this plan, whose origin Catholics know to be divine. Of all Powers in the world, the Papal Power is least of all subject to caprices in its policy; it is the least liable to be influenced by passion. He always who exerts that power is a priest; he is old and unmarried; he has been brought up away from the attractions of a home, and probably not among the prejudices of his nation. Thus are excluded from his rule all, or nearly all, the passions which trouble the States and rulers of the earth. The Popes, therefore, have severely rebuked and even excommunicated Kings and Emperors for their public and their private sins, at the same time asserting the divine origin and the unimpeachable authority of the sovereign power. The philosophers, on the other hand, who worship reason, and the statesmen, who think that they are uninfluenced except by expediency, have fawned on sovereigns and flattered their crimes, while they were undermining the authority of the sovereign power, and

practically denying the unchangeable law of God. The Popes, with one exception, which was speedily undone, never, even at the height of their power, obtained an inch of territory for themselves; not even at the times of the Crusades, when they conquered land from the infidels, would they continue to retain the land which they had conquered. Self-government throughout the States of the Church, and even in Rome itself, was never interfered with by the strongest of the Popes—not even by Nicholas III.,—and the Temporal Power was never intended for more than to prevent the Pope from being the subject of a secular sovereign, and the Church from becoming an instrument in the hands of a State, to subserve its ambitious projects. The secular States, on the other hand, have never resisted ambition; and no other Power, beside the Papal Power, even in these days of 'civilisation,' can justify all the possessions which it holds. Still less has any Temporal Power been found to restrain the lawlessness of other Powers, except in its own interest. But the Popes have restrained the ambition of other Powers, even when it was against their secular interest to do so. The Popes have been temporal sovereigns ever since the ninth century, and have excelled in power both Kings and Emperors. How was it, then, that the Popes did not aggrandise themselves as other sovereigns have done whenever they had the power; nor aspire to an absolute and universal secular dominion when it was within their grasp? The Popes did not even make themselves temporal sovereigns. The Temporal Power was not of their seeking. The Pontifical throne gradually grew up out of circumstances, without any one perceiving or knowing it.

Look at the years before A.D. 800. None of the Emperors would, for a moment, have suffered a rival in their army, nor even a competitor on any of the thrones of Europe; and every Emperor gloried in the names of Pontifex Maximus and Father of the People. Yet in Rome a poor priest of an alien religion, which had ever been trodden under the heel of the Emperor, became a Sovereign Pontiff, and Pontifex Maximus, and Universal Father, and far more powerful than the Emperor who hated, but could not crush him. The Emperors soon found that they possessed no powers which availed against the Popes; but that the Pope had a widespread, unseen, superhuman power over the Emperors. The Emperor Decius, after killing St. Fabian the Pope, exclaimed: 'I would rather have a competitor for my imperial throne than a new Bishop for Rome.' Prætextatus, Consul of Rome, said to Pope Damasus: 'I will become a Christian if only you will make me Bishop of Rome.' At last the Emperors could not brook the presence of this Christian priest beside them, and were driven by an unseen hand to Constantinople, and they abandoned Rome to the Popes. This is what has been called 'the gift of Charlemagne.' A gift of the unseen hand, let us rather say. Until this time the Roman Emperors had, in their ambition, been busy spreading the Latin language over the world, and accustoming those who used it to acknowledge the sovereignty of Rome, and regard her as the mistress of the world. *Sic vos non vobis!* They knew not for whom they were working. Yet the Emperor Constantine exclaimed when, in A.D. 313, he removed to Byzantium, which he called Constantinopolis, 'I follow some invisible guide, and I shall stop in my journey only

when he stops.' How, then, we ask, did all this come about?

Men account for it for by talking of 'the ascendancy of the Popes;' and they say that it was the ascendancy of the Popes which stopped the conquering Attila before the gates of Rome. What ascendancy? A moral ascendancy; a superiority in morals, which awed alike the civilised Roman and the fierce untutored barbarian. If not, how shall we account for that ascendancy? Was it not supernatural? What awe kept every conquering king from setting his throne in Rome? When Theodosius divided the Empire between his two sons, it was at Milan, not at Rome, that Honorius planted the seat of his power. When Odoacer overturned the Western Empire in A.D. 475, it was in Ravenna, not in Rome, that he reigned. Theodoric came, and Odoacer's power faded before the Goths. Yet Theodoric could not succeed in making Rome his capital. The Goths gave place to the Lombards; but Alboin chose Pavia for his seat of government. Luitprand, the fierce king of the Lombards, came with an army, and Eutychius, the exarch of Ravenna, came with an army, and they united under the walls of Rome, for they had entered into a solemn covenant that they would take Rome in order to make away with the Pope. Gregory II. went out to them, unarmed and unattended, except by the priests of his Church; and holding the cross in his hand, he spoke to these fierce warriors, as St. Leo, in like circumstances, had spoken to Attila. And Luitprand and his hardy Lombards fell in tears at the Pope's feet; and the armies retired from before Rome with a sense of awe of the unarmed Bishops of Rome. 'Whom seek ye? I am He! And they fell backward.'

Again in the year 1053, the victorious Normans, who had overrun South Italy, hastened to Civitella to seize the person of Pope Leo IX.; but the Pope went out to them in his Pontifical robes, holding a silver cross in his hand; and they fell at his feet and implored his pardon. In A.D. 1562 two hired ruffians, Accolti and Antonio da Canorsa, conspired to assassinate Pope Pius IV.; but when they saw his calm unsuspecting figure, walking devoutly in a procession, they betrayed themselves, and met the death they had intended for him. So no king could succeed in fixing his throne in Rome. Why was this? Because an invisible hand reached through the clouds of Heaven, and pushed them silently, secretly, away to Milan, to Ravenna, to Pavia. And the supreme authority came to the Popes, for Charlemagne put down the Lombards and left Rome to the Popes.

Yet all this while the Popes were endeavouring to preserve Italy to the Greek Emperors against the Goths and Lombards, and were adjuring the Emperors to come over and help them to save it. But it availed not. The Emperors would not come; and they became of no account. Yet to the Popes all kings and potentates ran for counsel and assistance. Before the year 600 we find St. Gregory writing (lib. i. *Epist.* 25 *ad Joh. Episc. Const.*): 'Hoc in loco quisquis Pastor dicitur, curis exterioribus graviter occupatur, ita ut sæpe incertum sit utrum pastoris officium an terreni proceris agat.' We find him sending legates to sovereigns, to make them act with mildness towards their subjects; we find him sending letters to the subjects to exhort them not to rebel against their sovereigns. We find him rebuking the mighty for their adulteries, reforming abuses

throughout Europe, introducing a stricter discipline, judging between mighty combatants, and stopping, or altogether preventing wars. Thus the Pope became, against his will, the supreme authority, the arbiter, the counsellor for all the sovereigns of the Christian world.

No. IX.

PERSONS speak, without thinking, of 'the gift of Charlemagne;' and fondly imagine that the Popes passed suddenly, by the whim of an earthly ruler, from the state of subjects, or private persons, to the condition of great and powerful sovereigns. Nothing could be more false. Long before the year 800 the Popes had been supreme in fact, and wanted only the title of sovereign. Thus Gregory II., writing to the Byzantine Emperor Leo, said: 'The whole West has its eyes turned to us, in our humility. . . It regards us as the arbitrator and moderator for the public tranquillity. . . . If *you* in the East also ventured to try, you would find us ready to take in hand and redress the injuries which your Eastern subjects are suffering.' Yes; before the Popes became sovereigns, they were the supreme authority over kings, and the arbiters between nations.

'The force of circumstances brought them to this.' This is true if, by the force of circumstances, you mean the hand of God, which directs all events. Or you may say that it was the 'moral ascendancy' of the Popes; for they were the ministers of God in the affairs of a troubled world. Anyhow, the power was thrust upon them. Was not the origin of this power undoubtedly divine? Let us look at the character of the power, in order to judge of its origin. For as we say, *Qualis causa, talis effectus;* so we say also that as

is the origin, so is the outcome. 'The first characteristic which strikes us is, that although the Popes wielded this enormous power, yet they never used it except to defend the right, and to establish justice. The Protestant Sismondi bears testimony to this: 'In the midst of the struggle concerning territorial jurisdictions, the Pope stood alone as the defender of the people and the peace-maker between feudatories.' So Voltaire says of that Pope who of all Popes has been the most abused: 'The man who, perhaps of all men, most merited the gratitude of the whole human race, was Pope Alexander III. It was he who, in a council of the twelfth century, abolished slavery as far as he was able to do so. . . . . He revised the rights of the people in every country, and repressed crime and immorality in rulers.' Does this not clearly prove that God's hand was present with the Popes to set them up?

Let us hastily turn over the pages of history. We find Pope Nicholas the Great carrying on a contest with Lothaire II., king of Lorraine (A.D. 860), who wanted to put away his wife, Teutberg, and marry Waldrade; and the Pope prevented the commission of a crime in high places. After the death of Nicholas I., Lothaire resumed the guilty intention; but Adrian II., in A.D. 869, excommunicated the king, and all who were privy to the design. The king thereupon submitted, and was absolved, on his swearing that he had for ever renounced Waldrade. He, however, swore falsely; and he died within a month. The Emperor Henry IV., likewise, had filled his palace with the frail victims of his debauches, and was about to put away his wife Praxedes. But Pope Alexander II. intervened to protect the rights of the lawful wife, and prevent so

great a wrong. Presently the Saxon people complained to the Pope of the Emperor's tyranny and injustice. The Pope excommunicated the Emperor's evil councillors, and menaced the Emperor himself with a like infliction, unless he governed more in accordance with the laws of God. In A.D. 1073 we find St. Gregory VII. (Hildebrand) rebuking Henry for his excesses and tyrannies, and recalling him somewhat from his evil ways. Four years afterwards this great and holy Pope met the Emperor at Canossa, near Reggio. When celebrating the divine office, he stopped; and holding up the Blessed Sacrament in his hands, he solemnly swore that, as he looked for eternal salvation, he had never acted but with a pure intention for the glory of God and the happiness of the people. Then he called upon the Emperor to swear the same; but the Emperor could not swear, and did not receive the Blessed Sacrament. Soon afterwards we find St. Gregory VII. writing that he will teach rulers that a true sovereign is never a tyrant; and, said he, 'we will furnish sovereigns with the weapons of humility, so that they may be able to repress the motions of pride.' 'Imperatoribus et regibus, cæterisque principibus, ut elationes maris et superbiæ fluctus comprimere valeant, arma humilitatis, Deo auctore, providere curamus.' The Emperors indeed treated the Popes with haughty insolence, imperious violence, and wanton excesses; but the Popes replied with Christian moderation and a meek and gentle firmness. How can we doubt, then, that it was the hand of God which advanced them?

In the year 1088, we find St. Gregory VII., and afterwards Urban II., excommunicating Philip I., king of France, for continuing an adulterous inter-

course. King Philip had imprisoned his queen, Bertha, and married the notorious Bertrade de Montfort. The Pope, on hearing this, had rebuked him; and as he did not become penitent he was excommunicated. Similarly, 125 years later, Pope Innocent III. put France under an interdict, until Philip Augustus took back his wife Ingerberg. He also obliged the king of Leon, in Spain, to separate from his niece, whom he had incestuously married; and he excommunicated John of England for the murder of Prince Arthur.* We turn to the year 1230, and find the Emperor Frederick II. (who had just made his submission to Pope Gregory IX., and had promised amendment for the future) returning to his former evil course of tyranny and exactions. Germany and the South of Italy revolted; Frederick attacked and took Vicenza. During the siege, he had placed the prisoners in catapults, and shot them into the town. Genoa, Milan, and Venice then turned to the Pope to save them. The Pope, after fruitless entreaties, again excommunicated Frederick in A.D. 1239. Frederick's reply was a declaration of war against the Pope. He marched to attack Rome, and burned all the Campagna. The Pope was 99 years old; but he led processions about the city and prayed, and encouraged the Romans. The savage Emperor committed unheard-of cruelties, yet Frederick had to retire from before Rome. The Pope then cited the Emperor to appear before a council in Rome, and answer for his crimes. But the Pope was 100 years old, and died. Pope Innocent IV. called a general council at Lyons (1245), and cited Frederick

* Cardinal Matthieu, *Le Pouvoir temporel*, p. 236: Paris, 1863.

to appear. This council excommunicated and deposed him. The Princes elected another Emperor, and Frederick died in bitter disappointment, A.D. 1250; and his sons and grandsons ('to the third generation') speedily came to miserable and untimely ends.

We pass over half a century, until the death of Rudolf of Hapsburg, and find Albert of Austria and Count Adolf of Nassau struggling for the imperial throne. Albert assassinated Adolf, and was immediately struck with the sentence of excommunication by Pope Boniface VIII. (A.D. 1302). Thus, as the Dutch have ever been industrious in raising dykes against the 'letting-in of the waters' of the sea, so the Popes have been ever vigilant in raising obstacles against a flood of unbridled vice, which, taking its rise in the high places of society, would inevitably have overwhelmed the world.

We do not, therefore, wonder at finding that the Princes who elected Henry VII. as their Emperor (A.D. 1312) first submitted their choice to Pope Clement V. for confirmation; and that the kingdoms of England, Portugal, Aragon, Poland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway placed themselves under the special protection of John XXII. (A.D. 1316), and paid him an annual tribute. We do not wonder; for the world then saw that God was with them.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Emperor Wenceslaus was deposed by the Pope, because he was 'negligent of his trust, unworthy and useless.' Edward II. and Richard II. of England were also formally judged and condemned in the regular courts of the Pope.*

* *Du Pape.* De Maistre, *Œuvres*, p. 373: Paris, 1862.

The battle of Lepanto was fought on October 7th, 1571. The Venetians and Spaniards, under Don John of Austria, fought the Turkish fleet off the promontory of Actium. At the moment of victory, Pope St. Pius V., who was sitting in the Vatican, at Rome, among his Cardinals, rose from his seat, and stretching forth his arms, commanded silence. Then he said: 'Let us give thanks to God, who has vouchsafed to us a glorious victory;' and he fell upon his knees in prayer. Not for many days after did the tidings reach others of that which Christ's Vicar knew by revelation.

These facts found places in the annals of history; yet history has passed over, in few words, the deeds of Parliament, the marriages of sovereigns, the conquests of science. These facts found places in history, for they were marvels in their time; and they were marvels because men saw in them the hand of God. In these days, who would notice them? In 1820, when Pius VIII. interfered, as the head of Christ's Church, to abolish slavery in the Brazils, who felt the 'moral ascendancy,' or said that, as this was good, it must have come from the Father of Lights? Yet every good gift and every perfect gift has come down from Him. The Popes, who have been a blessing to mankind, as the supreme arbiters of nations and councillors of kings, have come from Him. In checking the passions of peoples, and the tyrannies and lusts of kings, they nipped in the bud those seditions and tumults and frauds and wars and taxes and poverty which we now have to suffer because we despise the institution which Christ formed to save us from these evils.

No. X.

In our last numbers we alluded to the mysterious advance of the Papal Power, and the godly uses to which it was always turned. We showed that the Popes were ever on the watch to check those unbridled passions which have caused the miseries of States, and been the frequent origin of seditions, tumults, and wars. Voltaire has remarked (*Essai sur l'Histoire générale*), 'Whenever a court has yielded to debauch, seditions and revolutions have always been found to follow.'

We will mention two other examples. Boleslas, King of Poland, stabbed Stanislas, the Bishop of Cracow, for reproaching him with adultery. The Pope excommunicated him, and forbade the rulers of Poland from ever more calling themselves 'kings.' For many generations they styled themselves only 'dukes.'

When Napoleon I. had got nearly all Europe in his power, he attacked our trade, in order to cripple our resources. The other governments of course yielded their concurrence. It was an illegal act of Napoleon thus to violate the internal or municipal law of every other country. The Pope, however, alone in all Europe (as we find from Cardinal Gonsalvi's life) refused to sanction those Berlin and Milan decrees, and grounded his refusal on the proposition of international law, that every alliance which prohibits a country from holding intercourse with a nation from whom it had suffered no wrong, is contrary to law. General Miollis

was thereupon ordered to occupy Rome, and the Pope was made a prisoner. This was in 1808. (See Koch's *Revolutions of Europe.*)

Before we cite a few examples of the stoppage of wars and bloodshed by the interference of the Popes, let us consider for a moment the nature of this jurisdiction itself. Previously to the time of Constantine, says Cardinal Matthieu, the Bishops used to act as arbitrators in disputes, so as to obviate the necessity of 'going to law, and that too before unbelievers.' They did this, at that time, out of charity. But from the time of Constantine there was a real jurisdiction vested in them. At first the Episcopal sentence was of force only from the inherent authority of justice and the consent of the parties; after Constantine the Episcopal judgment had the force of law; and either party who desired might refuse to be judged in a Secular Court, and thus bring the matter before the Episcopal Court. In the year 368, Valentinian and Valens (*Cod. Justin.*, lib. i. tit. iv.), charged the Bishops to prevent frauds by merchants and traders, and to exact reparation if any fraud had been committed. Subsequently the Emperors extended this power to all cases in which the poor, the weak, prisoners, and persons who were otherwise helpless, had suffered injury. Soon the Bishops were made the governors and even legislators of towns, the heads of the police, the guardians of the municipal purse, the surveyors and judges of weights and measures. (*Cod. Justin.*, lib. i. tit. v.) Thus we find Socrates, the ecclesiastical historian, saying (*Hist. Eccl.*, lib. vii. cap. 7-13) that the Popes, a long time before Celestinus, had exercised a temporal dominion as well as a spiritual

authority. This temporal dominion was generally exercised through the Bishops, or in graver cases by Papal legates specially selected for the purpose. Thus Pope Innocent I. wrote in A.D. 404 to the Archbishop of Rouen, 'Si majores causæ in medium fuerint devolutæ, sicut Synodus [Sardica] statuit et vetus consuetudo exigit, ad sedem Apostolicam, post episcopale judicium, referantur.' St. Zozimus, Sixtus III., and Pope St. Leo the Great wrote similarly to other Archbishops. The Council of Sardica, which took from the Bishops the *final* judgment in major causes, and ordered that an appeal should lie to the Pope, was held in the year 347. It appears, however, from Pope Innocent's letter that such an appeal to the Pope in the graver cases was, even at that time, an 'ancient custom.'

In the gravest cases, the accused, if he remained impenitent after the judgment of the Pope had been passed, was visited with excommunication. The sentence of excommunication was always preceded by an exhortation to avoid it, by turning from the evil of which he had been convicted. The Pope waited patiently and in hope, until he felt sure that the criminal would not 'hear the Church;' he then excommunicated him, or, according to Pope Innocent III., declared him to be 'as an heathen man and publican.' The fear of excommunication spared the world many and great scandals, and many of those intestine wars and revolutions which always assail corrupt nations. According to Cardinal Matthieu, there were three classes of sins which called down upon the impenitent criminal the sentence of excommunication: sins against morals, sins against justice, and persistent errors against the faith. Excommunication followed sins against

morals; thus Waldrade and King Lothaire were excommunicated for their adulterous commerce; King Robert (in A.D. 998), for his incestuous marriage with Bertha; Philip I., for his unlawful marriage with Bertrade (A.D. 1094); and Philip II. for his adulterous connection with Agnes de Méranie (A.D. 1198). Excommunication followed sins against justice; as when St. Gregory VII. excommunicated Henry IV. of Germany for oppressing his subjects; or when Frederick I. (Barbarossa) was put under sentence of excommunication for protecting and favouring the Antipope Victor; or Henry II. of England, for usurping the rights which belonged to the See of Canterbury; or the various sovereigns whom we shall presently mention, for persisting in unjust wars. The Popes, as the guardians of the faith, the avengers of justice, and the interpreters of the moral law, could not, as Cardinal Matthieu remarks, without sin, keep silence when any of them was transgressed. The Popes differed from the Antipopes in this: the Popes, without exception, preferred to incur the anger of Emperors and Kings, rather than keep silence in presence of crime; the Antipopes, without exception, preferred to purchase the favour and support of the powerful, by a vile compliance with their passions and by glozing over their crimes. Public opinion supported those courageous Popes, and acknowledged that they were doing their duty; for they knew that the Popes alone, of all men in those days, could remind Kings that license is not the privilege of power; and could tell the people that those who excuse the criminals take part in the crime.

This matter is so important that, before giving examples of the interference of the Popes to stop wars,

we shall quote from the books of two Protestants—from M. Guizot's *Lectures on History*, and from Mr. Froude's *History of England*. 'The clergy of the Church,' writes M. Guizot in his second lecture, 'had besides this a very different means of influence. The Bishops and the clergy had become the chief municipal magistrates. We have already observed that, properly speaking, there had remained, of the Roman Empire, no more than the municipal system. By the oppressions of despotism, and by the ruining of the towns, the *curiales*, or members of the municipal bodies, had fallen by degrees into discouragement and apathy; the Bishops, on the contrary, and the whole body of priests, who were full of life, and full of zeal, naturally offered their services for the superintendence and direction of everything. It would be very unjust and erroneous to reproach them for doing so, or to accuse them of usurpation. It was in obedience to the natural course of events; the clergy alone were morally strong and full of life; therefore the clergy everywhere obtained all the power. This is merely in accordance with a universal law.

'This character is impressed on the legislation of the Roman Emperors at that period. Open the Theodosian or the Justinian Code, and you will meet with a number of enactments which place municipal affairs in the hands of the clergy and the Bishops. . . . . It would be easy to cite a large number of such laws; but this fact meets us at every turn: between the Roman municipal system and the municipal system of the Middle Ages, the ecclesiastical municipal system intervened. The preponderance of the clergy in the affairs of every city, succeeded that of the old Roman magis-

trates, and preceded the organisation of the modern Communes.

'It is thus perceived what prodigious powers and enormous influence the Christian Church obtained, whether in her own constitution, or in her action on the Christian populace, or in the part which she took in secular affairs. From this time forth she exerted a very great influence on the character and development of modern civilisation. First, there was an immense advantage in the mere presence of a moral influence, a moral force, a force based entirely on the convictions, the faith, and the moral sense of the people, amidst that deluge of material force which, at that period, overwhelmed the whole of society. If the Christian Church had not existed, the whole world would have been delivered over to mere brute force. She alone exerted a moral power. She did more; she observed and she inculcated the idea of rule, the idea of a law above all human laws; she herself professed this belief, so essential to the rescuing of humanity, that there is above all human laws a law which has sometimes been called Reason, sometimes Divine Right, but which is at all times and in all places the same law, although it may receive diverse appellations. . . . .

'The Spiritual Power then, finding itself at the head of the activity of human thought, naturally took the general government of the world. There was another cause which also led to the same result; the frightful condition of the temporal order of things, the violence, the iniquity which was dominant in the secular government of all societies. Lately persons have talked at their ease of "the rights of the secular power;" but at the period with which we are engaged the secular

power was simply a brute force,—an intractable brigandage. The Church . . . . was infinitely superior to such a secular power; the earnest cry of the people was ever urging her to take the place of the secular power. . . . . Generally speaking, whenever men lost their liberties, it was the Christian Church which undertook to restore those liberties.' In the tenth century, nowhere was the people able to defend itself, and to establish its rights in the face of the violence of the State; the Church then interfered in the name of Heaven.'

In the sixth lecture M. Guizot writes: 'The Church worked hard and in a most efficacious manner for the amelioration of the social state. There is no doubt that she struggled obstinately against the great vices of the social state,—for example, slavery. . . . . The Church laboured equally for the suppression of a whole crowd of barbarous practices, and for the amelioration of civil and criminal legislation. . . . . There is, among the institutions of the Church, one which generally passes with too little notice: I speak of her penitentiary system,—a system which is, in these days, a curious subject of study, seeing that her principles and application of penal justice were completely in accordance with the ideas of philosophy. If you study the punishments awarded by the Church,—the public penances, for example, which were her principal chastisements,—you will observe that they were calculated to excite a feeling of contrition in the mind of the guilty person, and in the minds of the spectators a wholesome fear at his example. . . . . She also endeavoured, by every means, to repress the recourse to violence which was common in society, and to put

down the wars which were so frequent. Every one has heard of the Truce of God, and of a number of other measures of the same kind, by which the Church struggled against the employment of force, and endeavoured to introduce more order and more mildness into society.'

No. XI.

Let us get rid of the notion that the Church is an abstract thing, and regard her as a real substantial society and powerful institution. How could Christianity ever have prevailed against the existing and powerful Pagan legislation and the deep-rooted Pagan ideas, and against the prevailing ferocity and brutality of manners, if (as Protestants suppose) the Church was only a religious idea—an abstraction, which changed with men's ideas and was subject to the caprice of rulers. Speaking of the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth centuries, M. Guizot says: 'Purposely I say the Christian Church—not the Christian religion. Christianity was not the mere belief of individuals; it was an institution; it was constituted; it had its government, its body of clergy, a hierarchy definitely ordered for the different functions of the clergy; it possessed revenues, independent means of action, rallying-points which would be suitable for a great society, namely Councils —Provincial, National, and Œcumenical—where it treated, in common, the affairs of the society. In a word, Christianity was not merely a religion; it was a Church. If it had not been a Church at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, I do not know what would have been the result of that general cataclysm. Of course I confine myself to purely human considerations; I put aside every element which is foreign to natural consequences and natural events; and I say,

that if Christianity had been no more than a belief, a feeling, an individual conviction, . . . then we may well suppose that, in the fall of the Empire and the invasion of the Barbarians, it would itself have succumbed. . . . It is clear that there was an absolute need of a society which was definitely organised and firmly governed, to struggle against so great a disaster, to issue triumphantly from such a hurricane. I think I am not saying too much when I affirm that at the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth centuries, it was the Christian Church which saved Christianity; it was the Church, with her institutions, her rulers, and her power, which made a vigorous stand against the internal dissolution of the Empire, and against external barbarism; it was she who conquered the Barbarians, and became the bond of union, the medium, the principle of civilisation between the Roman world and the barbarian world. It is, therefore, the state of the Church, rather than the state of religion, in the fifth century, which we must consider when inquiring what advantages Christianity contributed to modern civilisation, and to what elements of civilisation it gave birth.'

To one of the institutions which the Church formed for the civilisation of the world we alluded in our last number. The Truce of God was a law of the Church, that no attack was to be made, and no violence was to be committed, and no fighting to take place on any of the days of religious solemnity, nor from Friday until Monday morning. The result of a violation of the Truce of God was excommunication and banishment.

By the Council of Narbonne, in the year 1045, the Truce was made to apply also to the periods from

the first Sunday in Advent to the Octave of the Epiphany; from Quinquagesima Sunday to the Octave of Easter; and from the Sunday preceding the Ascension to the Octave of Pentecost; also to all fast days and to many Saints' days. It was also extended to shepherds with their flocks, at all times of the year; and to all houses within thirty paces of any church. Also; all men were forbidden to take any steps for redress or reprisal until their case had been judged by the Bishop of the place. For in those days rights used to be determined by force; so that men had come to look on might as right; and even private quarrels were frequently terminated by assassination, or else by duels.

Pope Alexander II. confirmed the Truce of God in the year 1068, attaching to any violation of it the pain of excommunication. In the year 1095, Urban II. extended it from Thursday to Monday (beside the time already mentioned); also to an enemy who, when pursued, took refuge under a cross. He also decreed that all persons, on reaching the age of twelve years, should take a solemn oath to observe the Truce of God. Pope Calixtus II. solemnly confirmed it at Rheims in A.D. 1119; and it was again confirmed by the Council of Lateran in A.D. 1123; and by Innocent II. in the year 1130. In the year 1195, a Truce of God was proclaimed, which was to last, without interruption, for three years.*

It would be wrong, however, to conceive that the efforts of the Church were directed against violence only. This was only one point out of many to which were directed the efforts of the Church to enforce the whole moral law, or in other words the Decalogue.

* Balmez.

Thus even in Mr. Froude's history (vol. i.) we read: 'In the Middle Ages, a lofty effort had been made to overpass the common limitations of government, to introduce punishments for sins as well as crimes, and to visit with temporal penalties the breach of the moral law. The punishment best adapted for such offences was some outward expression of the disapproval with which good men regard acts of sin; some open disgrace; some spiritual censure; some suspension of the communion with the Church, accompanied by other consequences practically inconvenient, to be continued until the offender had made reparation, or had openly repented, or had given confirmed proof of amendment. The administration of such a discipline fell, as a matter of course, to the clergy. The clergy were the guardians of morality; their characters were a claim to confidence, their duties gave them opportunities of observation which no other men could possess; while their priestly office gave solemn weight to their sentences. Thus arose, throughout Europe, a system of spiritual surveillance over the habits and conduct of every man, extending from the cottage to the castle, taking note of all wrong dealing, of all oppression of man by man, of all licentiousness and profligacy, and representing upon earth, in the principles by which it was guided, the laws of the great tribunal of Almighty God.

'Such was the origin of the Church Courts, perhaps the greatest institutions ever yet devised by man. But to aim at these high ideals is as perilous as it is noble; and weapons which may be safely trusted in the hands of saints, become fatal implements of mischief when saints have ceased to wield them. For a time, we need not doubt, the practice corresponded to the inten-

tion. Had it not been so, the conception would have taken no root, and would have been extinguished at its birth. . . Each private person was liable to be called in question for every action of his life; and an elaborate network of canon law, perpetually growing, enveloped the whole surface of society. . . . The misdemeanours of which the courts took cognisance [see Hale's *Criminal Causes*, from the Records of the Consistory Court of London] were "offences against chastity, heresy or matter sounding thereunto, witchcraft, drunkenness, scandal, defamation of character, impatient words, broken promises, untruth, &c."

'In the brief review of the system under which England was governed we have seen a state of things in which the principles of political economy were, consciously or unconsciously, contradicted; where an attempt, more or less successful, was made to bring the production and distribution of wealth under the moral rule of right and wrong; and where those laws of supply and demand, which we are now taught to regard as immutable ordinances of nature, were absorbed or superseded by a higher code. . . . . Of liberty in the modern sense of the word, of the supposed right of every man to do what he will with his own, or with himself, there was no idea. To the question, if ever it was asked, May I not do what I will with my own? there was the brief answer: No man may do what is wrong, either with that which is his own, or with that which is another's. Workmen were not allowed to take advantage of the scantiness of the labour-market to exact extravagant wages. Capitalists were not allowed to drive the labourers from their holdings, and destroy their healthy independence. The antagonism of interests

was absorbed into a relation of which equity was something more than the theoretic principle, and employers and employed were alike amenable to a law which both were compelled to obey. The working man of modern times has bought the extension of his "liberty" at the price of his material comfort. The higher classes have gained in luxury what they have lost in power.'

The historian, of course, describes the system of Trade Guilds. The object of those societies was to secure honesty in dealing and the strict fulfilment of all religious duties, by the whole trading community. They regulated the prices of all goods, and treated with the utmost severity any member who overcharged a customer, or who adulterated the goods that he sold, or who did not see that his apprentices duly performed all their religious exercises. This was one of the institutions which had been raised up by the Church, for the amelioration of society. Of it, Mr. Froude says: 'That the system succeeded for centuries is evident from the organisation of the companies remaining so long in its vitality; but the efficiency of this organisation for the maintenance of fair dealing could exist only so long as the companies themselves—their wardens and their officials, who alone, *quisque in suâ arte*, were competent to judge what was right and what was wrong—could be trusted, at the same time being interested parties, to give a disinterested judgment.' This healthy vitality continued for centuries, as long as the cause of vitality was there. But, *sublatâ causâ*, the vitality ceased; and the progress which then ensued has ever since been a progress in decline and an advance in decomposition. 'In the 7th and 8th of Elizabeth,' says Mr. Froude, 'there are indications of the truck system; and towards

her later years the multiplying statutes and growing complaints and difficulties show plainly that the companies had lost their healthy vitality, and with other relics of feudalism were fast taking themselves away. There were no longer tradesmen to be found in sufficient numbers, who were possessed of the necessary probity; and it is impossible not to connect such a phenomenon with the deep melancholy which, in those years, settled down on Elizabeth herself. For indeed a change was coming upon the world, the meaning and direction of which even still is hidden from us; a change from era to era. The paths trodden by the footsteps of ages were broken up; old things were passing away, and the faith and life of ten centuries were dissolving like a dream. Chivalry was dying; the abbey and the castle were soon together to crumble into ruins; and all the forms, desires, beliefs, convictions of the old world were passing away, never to return. . . . . And now it is all gone — like an unsubstantial pageant faded; and between us and the old English there lies a gulf of mystery which the prose of the historian will never adequately bridge. They cannot come to us, and our imagination can but feebly penetrate to them. Only among the aisles of the cathedrals, only as we gaze upon their silent figures sleeping on their tombs, some faint conceptions float before us of what these men were when they were alive; and perhaps in the sound of the church bells, that peculiar creation of a mediæval age, which falls upon the ear like the echo of a vanished world.'

No. XII.

ALMOST as soon as the Church issued from the grievous persecutions by which she was nearly crushed, she applied herself resolutely to put down the resort to violence which was customary with individuals and nations. Minor causes, as we have already remarked, were disposed of by the Bishops; the graver cases only were, by a custom which prevailed before the Council of Sardica, sent to the Pope for final adjudication; while rules of conduct were promulgated by provincial or national Synods. Thus the Council of Arles (A.D. 443), in its 50th Canon, interdicted the use of the church and the advantages of the Sacraments to all persons who had quarrelled, until they became sincerely reconciled. Ten years later the Council of Angers, in its 3d Canon, more strongly denounced every act of violence. The Council of Agde, in Languedoc (A.D. 506), decreed in their 31st Canon, that if two persons, who had quarrelled, refused to hear and obey the judgment of the priest in determining the quarrel, they should be *ipso facto* excommunicate. The Council of Lerida (A.D. 546) ordered, in the 7th Canon, that he who has sworn to pursue an enemy till death, shall be under sentence of excommunication until he has done penance for the sinful oath, and become entirely reconciled to his enemy. The 41st Canon of the Council of Worms (A.D. 868) excommunicated all persons who refused to lay aside their quarrels and become recon-

ciled. By the Council of Llandaff (A.D. 560), three British kings were excommunicated: Monric, King of Glamorgan, for killing King Cinétha; King Morcant, for killing Tiac, his uncle; and King Guidnert, for killing his brother, who was a competitor for the throne. These hardy Britons, however, submitted, did penance, and were absolved.*

The city of Thessalonica revolted, and put the Governor to death. When the Emperor received intelligence of this catastrophe, he, in anger, ordered that the citizens of Thessalonica should be exterminated. After a time milder counsels prevailed, and he revoked the order. His second messenger was, however, too late; for vengeance had, on his arrival, been already taken. The Emperor was at Milan, and St. Ambrose wrote to him, saying that the Sacrifice should not be offered if the Emperor, thus stained with blood-guiltiness, were even present. The Emperor came one morning to the Church. St. Ambrose stood in the doorway, and fearlessly forbade the Emperor to enter. The Emperor thereupon submitted, and when he had performed a severe penance he received absolution.†

In the year 446, the Emperor Honorius implored St. Leo the Great to go to Attila, and endeavour to stop the fearful ravages which the fierce barbarian was committing, and to conclude a peace, so as to save Italy from utter destruction. St. Leo went to the banks of the Mincio, and approached Attila in his full pontificals, and with no attendants except a few priests. Attila was awed by his calm presence and mild words; peace was concluded, the fears of Italy were at an end, and Attila's fearless hosts retired from

* Balmez. † Ibid.

before the unarmed and unattended Vicar of Christ. Three years later the Vandals and Moors of Genseric were at the walls of Rome. Again St. Leo preserved the inhabitants from death, and the town from conflagration. It was a victory of spiritual power over material force. In A.D. 476, the Arian Odoacer, having conquered Italy and overturned the Western Empire, met St. Severinus the Pope, and peace was secured for eleven years.

St. Gregory was the successful mediator between the Emperor and the Lombards in their wars. Cardinal Matthieu says of him: 'The confidence of the whole world made him become, during the thirteen years of his Pontificate, the universal arbiter of peace and war.' Gibbon, speaking of the origin of the temporal power of the Popes, says that St. Gregory had saved Italy from bloodshed and destruction, and therefore had the best of titles to a supreme authority. It is, therefore, without surprise that we find Pope Gregory II. (A.D. 726) sending ambassadors to Charles Martel, and treating him as an equal; and King Pepin receiving Pope Stephen as the universal sovereign.

Pope Zacharias (A.D. 741) went out with his bishops and clergy to meet Luitprand, King of the Lombards, at Terni, and persuaded that monarch to spare the effusion of blood, and to make peace with the Duchy of Rome and all Italy for a period of twenty years. Luitprand then turned his arms against the Exarch of Ravenna, and took from him many provinces. The Pope hastened to the spot, and acting with great energy, he stopped the war, saved Ravenna for the Emperor, and procured the restoration of the conquered provinces.

Pope Stephen II. (A.D. 752) was consulted, as head of the Church and supreme arbiter, by peoples and sovereigns of the whole world; and the justice of his judgments enforced respect to his decisions. Astolphus, King of the Lombards, broke the peace of Pope Zacharias, seizing Istria, Ravenna, and other provinces, and preparing to attack the Duchy of Rome. The Pope induced him to conclude a peace for forty years. In four months Astolphus broke the peace, and the Pope had to fly for refuge to France. King Pepin instantly prepared to make war on Astolphus. The Pope however restrained his ardour and enjoined him to offer peace three times, on the condition that Astolphus should restore the towns which he had unjustly seized. A fourth time restitution was demanded; for, at the very last, the Pope wrote, conjuring Astolphus to do justly and thus save the effusion of blood. Astolphus refused to hear of justice, and his army was cut to pieces. Cardinal Orsi, who mentions this fact (lib. ii. c. vii.), asserts that the Pope acted eminently in support of the rules of morality and the law of nations.

On the death of Astolphus (A.D. 756) there were two claimants for the throne, the Duke of Tuscany, and the brother of Astolphus, who was a monk at Monte Cassino. Civil war was on the point of breaking out, and the Franks and Lombards were prepared to take part in it, when the Pope put an end to the strife by pronouncing a decision in favour of the Duke.

Lando filled the Papal chair for only five months; yet during that time he succeeded in effecting a peace between Berengarius, King of Italy, and Rudolf, King of Germany, who were competitors for the imperial throne. In the year 914 John X. succeeded to the

Papal throne. He secured the imperial crown to King Berengarius, and brought him into alliance with the Eastern Empire. The Pope then turned his eyes to Italy, where he induced the Princes of Capua, Spoleto, Salerno, and Benvenuto to lay aside their animosities, and enter into a close alliance. Thus peace from intestine broils was secured for the whole peninsula, and the Saracens were expelled in the ensuing year.

Under Pope John XV. (A.D. 990), says Baronius, the King of England (*i.e.* Ethelred, King of the West Saxons) had a quarrel with Richard, 'Marquis' (Duke) of Normandy. The question at issue was carefully investigated by the Pope, who sent a legate with a letter to Normandy, and a letter of admonition to the English king. In these letters the Pope 'testified his sorrow that his spiritual sons should strive together, and conjured all the faithful in their respective kingdoms, for the love and fear of God Almighty, and of St. Peter the Prince of the Apostles, and in obedience to his paternal admonition, to agree to a lasting peace with all men now and hereafter, without reserve or deception.' So the English monarch sent an embassy to Normandy, and the terms of 'a perpetual peace, which should never be disturbed,' were arranged, and they bound themselves by a clause in the treaty, that 'if at any time afterwards either of them considered that he had been wronged, the case should be submitted to the adjudication of the Pope, and the wrong-doer should thereupon make restitution, so that peace might never more be broken.' They then swore on the Blessed Sacrament to preserve the treaty inviolate for ever.

Pope Victor II. ascended the throne in A.D. 1054. Having assembled the Council of Florence, in which

he announced the principles on which the Church should be governed, he travelled to Germany, at the instance of Henry III., to give peace to the Empire, which was in revolt, and to unite the imperial family, which was torn by intestine quarrels. The Emperor, dying in 1056, appointed Pope Victor as Regent and guardian of Henry IV. His policy was a policy of peace. He united all the Princes of Germany in friendly alliance, and was therefore regarded with reverence by each one, and acknowledged as the supreme father and just arbiter in all their dissensions.

Before William the Conqueror ventured to invade England, his grievance was submitted to the jurisdiction of the Pope; and it was not until the Pope had declared the justice of the war, that he embarked on the campaign. In the same way Henry II. of England subsequently refrained from attacking Ireland until the case had been submitted to Pope Adrian IV. (A.D. 1154).

In A.D. 1073, the people of Saxony and the Princes of Germany wanted to depose the Emperor Henry, and elect Rudolf, Duke of Suabia, in his stead. The Pope however ordered a suspension of arms, until he had investigated and judged the quarrel, and decided what would be just. In this year we also see Pope St. Gregory VII. forbidding the Dalmatians to rise in revolt against their King; and saying that if they had any difference, it should be referred to him for judgment, so that peace should not be disturbed. Two years later we find Demetrius, King of the Russians, petitioning the Pope to confirm him in his kingdom. The Diet of Forcheim, in A.D. 1077, finally deposed the Emperor Henry IV. (the Pope having by this time

given judgment against him), and named Rudolf of Suabia in his stead. The two claimants then appealed to the Pope, and engaged through their ambassadors, as Maimbourg informs us, to abide by his decision. Rudolf was confirmed as Emperor, and therefore engraved on his diadem, 'Petra* dedit Petro, Petrus diadema Rudolpho;' by which he meant that, as Jesus Christ had given the sovereign power to Peter, so the Pope transmitted the imperial authority to Rudolf.

* Padre Liberatore, S.J., in his *La Chiesa e lo Stato*, remarks that the verse required that the word 'Petra' should be substituted for 'Deus.' The former expression is in allusion to the words of St. Paul: 'And that Rock is Christ;' or to 'the Stone of stumbling and Rock of offence.'

No. XIII.

CALIXTUS II. succeeded Pope Gelasius in the year 1119. He at once summoned a General Council at Rheims, which heard and investigated for him the cases of many princes, who were then at war, as well as the complaint of the Countess of Poitiers, who had been deserted by her husband. Two years later, having subdued the Emperor's Antipope, he applied himself with great address to reconcile with each other the warring princes of Germany. In A.D. 1123, at the time of the first Lateran Council, the Pope issued a decree forbidding private persons from ever carrying arms in the city of Rome; and he destroyed the fortresses, and disbanded the troops of the Frangipani and other lawless leaders in Italy; so that his death, which occurred in A.D. 1124, was regarded as a calamity by the whole of Europe.

We come now to the reign of Alexander III. In the year 1161, King Louis of France, and Henry II. of England, collected 'immense armies,' says Baronius, and took the field. A sanguinary battle was imminent, when a legate arrived from the Pope, and examined the grounds of the quarrel, and made peace, by pronouncing judgment in the name of the Pope. Each of the sovereigns thereupon collected the Bishops of their respective kingdoms, and recognised Alexander III. as 'the Bishop of the Holy Catholic Church,' and pro-

claimed Octavianus, who was the Emperor Frederick's Antipope, to be 'no better than a usurper.' In the peace-maker, both England and France recognised the servant of the God of peace. In the same year the Emperor (Barbarossa) laid siege to Milan, resorting to the most barbarous cruelties during the contest. He destroyed the whole town, except the churches, and sowed it with salt. All eyes were turned to Alexander III. The Pope excommunicated the Emperor, and was very soon obliged to fly to France for refuge. The Emperor thereupon sent the most heinous letter to Louis VII., King of France (Jan. 1162), inciting him to seize or make away with the person of the Pope; and supported with the utmost vigour, in Italy, the Antipope Octavianus. In 1165, Alexander III. returned to Italy, and united the whole peninsula in a league of amity, and all the towns swore to observe it for twenty years. By establishing peace, the Pope snatched from Frederick his power for evil. Frederick shortly marched on Rome and took it, the Pope flying for safety to Naples. Frederick, deeming that his object was attained, caused himself to be crowned by his Antipope in St. Peter's at Rome. But a pestilence broke out in Frederick's army on the very next day; the army was destroyed; and on the fourth day the Emperor ran away, and succeeded in gaining Burgundy in the dress of a valet, with only thirty men to follow him. Again he endeavoured to make head in 1174; but his army was put to rout by the Venetians. The Emperor sued now to the Pope to make peace, and fully recognised his supreme authority. The Pope insisted that the peace should also include the Lombards, the King of Sicily, and the Eastern Emperor. The treaty

of Constance in 1183 reiterated the conditions of this peace.

Pope Innocent III. (Lothaire) succeeded to the throne of St. Peter in 1198. There were three pretenders to the imperial power, on the death of Henry VI.: Philip, Duke of Suabia, a Ghibelline; Otho, Duke of Brunswick, a Guelf; and Frederick II. One part of the electors chose Philip; the rest repudiated his election, and chose Berthold, Duke of Zähringen. Berthold, however, refused the proffered honour, and then Otho was elected by this portion of the electors. The Pope considered the claims of all the parties, and pronounced in favour of Otho, so as to prevent, if it had been possible, the rivalry from leading to bloodshed. His Bull proves the extent to which he had mastered the details. The state of Italy, on Innocent's accession, was such as to cause grave apprehensions. The warring factions of the Guelfs and Ghibellines divided every town in the peninsula; the city of Rome was disturbed by those who sought to establish the old Roman Republic; and the Suabians and Normans were at daggers-drawn in South Italy. In France civil war was simmering, because Philip Augustus had put away his lawful wife and taken Ingerberg instead. The Moors were gaining ground in Spain. Such was the state of things at the beginning of Pope Innocent's reign. In eighteen years, under his wise rule, these wars and rumours of wars had ceased, and the whole face of Europe was changed.

Hungary was divided by two claimants to the throne; but bloodshed was stopped by an appeal to the Pope to decide between their claims. Sicily refused to recognise Frederick II., the son of the last

Emperor. But Constance, his mother, put the kingdom in the hands of the Pope, who administered its affairs, and returned it to Frederick, on his attaining his majority, in a far more flourishing condition than any kingdom in Europe.

At the succession of John to the throne of England, a war broke out with France. John appealed to the Pope. Philip, the King of France, who had made conquests from England, said beforehand that he would not submit to the Pope's decision. Then Innocent III. wrote to Philip, in A.D. 1201, the famous letter '*Novit ille*,' which may be seen in the second volume of the Decretals. In this letter the Pope ordered the King to submit to the judgment of the Cardinal Legate, Peter of Capua, whom he had sent over to investigate the case. Philip submitted, and the war was ended. Two years afterwards, however, John broke the peace. Innocent sent letters to the two Kings, and to the Archbishops of France and England. According to Reynaldus, who has taken his facts from the histories of Robertus de Monte and of Matthew Paris, the Pope's Legate, the Abbot of Casamari, adjured the French King, 'for the good of the Christian commonwealth,' to make peace with the King of England. Philip answered that it was not the business of the Pope to meddle in the quarrels of secular sovereigns. The Pope answered in a temperate and eloquent letter: '*Utinam considerasses salubrius*, &c.,' reminding the King that 'he (the Pope) sought the good of the French kingdom as well as the good of the English; that Philip was prosperous at that time, but that every one in the day of prosperity should think of the time of adversity, and that the event of war was most uncertain;

that he (the Pope) could not allow the answer of Philip to be drawn into a precedent by subsequent generations; not that he wished to usurp any power which did not already belong to him, or to issue any injunction which was out of his jurisdiction; Quid enim monuimus? quid suggessimus? num quid inhonestum? num quid injustum? Certe, si bene recolimus, ut faceretis pacem, vel treguas, salvâ justitiâ utriusque. . . . Quod enim evangelizare pacem ex injuncto nobis officio teneamur, Psalmista nos docet, . . . et angeli, qui Dominicæ nativitatis primitias pastoribus intimarunt, . . . ipse quoque Dominus Jesus Christus; . . . Pacem meam do vobis, Pacem relinquo vobis, He said to Peter and His Apostles. Thus He taught them the form of preaching: Into whatsoever house ye enter, say, Peace to this house; and to the citizens who did not receive the messengers of peace, sent by the King of Peace, He told them to say, Amen I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha in that day. Besides, no one denies that what pertains to the salvation or damnation of souls belongs to us, and is our function; yet nothing leads to damnation so much as the production of discords, the spilling of blood, the causing of so much misery, &c. And remember the injunction of the Gospel: If thy brother shall have sinned against thee, take him apart and speak to him, and if thou shalt make peace thou wilt have gained thy brother; but if he will not hear thee, take with thee two or three more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established; and if he then will not hear them, tell it to the Church; and if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen man and a publican. Now the King of

England is your brother, not in the flesh, but in the unity of the faith; . . . so if you will not hear the Church, what shall I do? Shall I fear to offend you or to offend God? I will proclaim you a heathen man and publican. But if you argue that you did not offend against him (King John), but he against you, what then shall we do? We must make a more searching inquiry, and having learned the truth, we shall proceed as the Lord has commanded, &c.'

The Legate who delivered this letter proceeded to inquire very carefully, as he had been ordered to do, and to bring under the knowledge of each of the antagonists the wrongs that he had done, and to urge that he should make reparation for each of those wrongs. The two Kings unreservedly laid their whole complaints before the representative of the Pope.

This fact, as Reynaldus relates it, is not only a pre-eminent instance of the stoppage of bloodshed and injustice by the Head of the Christian Church; but it is more. The letter of the Pope, of which we have given a brief sketch, is a most eloquent exposition of the grounds on which the Pope claimed the right and title to judge the quarrels of princes and nations. The action of those powerful Kings of the two most powerful nations, shows that all Christianity at that time regarded the Head of the Church as we desire that the world should regard him now. If this had not been the general feeling of Europe in the times when the end of every man's education was to make him hardy and mighty in war, when every soothing learning and custom was despised by the laity, when there was nothing but the Church to polish men's manners and soften their hearts,—then every nation would have been

involved in internecine struggles, and every town would have been divided against itself in the bloody frays of violent faction. But the Church then united towns, and made a real brotherhood of nations. If there was faction, it was when men were led by their passions and refused to hear the Church; if there was war in those days, it was when some powerful monarch, in the pride of his heart, chose to take Lucifer and not Christ as the model for his life. Are these the days of civilisation? Yet there are wars. Are these the days when luxury is made a science, and every enervating art is practised, and everything to soften the manners is made a custom, and men are not taught the art nor used to the habits of war, and are not inured to the hardships of the field? Yet there is faction, and bloodshed, piracy, and murder, and every injustice. If, then, the Church stopped wars and cemented union in those days, when everything was against her success, let us look to her now, and seek from her now that remedy which never failed in days gone by. Nothing but the will on the people's side is wanting; nothing is wanting but to conquer the fostered pride of these days, and to render a hearty submission to the Church, and success will be now, as formerly, assured.

No. XIV.

THE Christian policy of Innocent III., so beautifully expressed in the letter which we quoted in our last, was continued by Honorius III. He commenced his reign by bringing about a peace between Henry III. of England and his Barons; and secondly, between Henry III. and Philip Augustus. In A.D. 1275 Demetrius was hunted from the throne of Russia, and appealed to Pope Gregory X. as the Supreme Judge and Universal Father of all Christians. In the next year Pope Innocent V. successfully laboured to make peace between Pisa and Lucca, and to calm the excited passions in Florence, where blood had begun to flow in civil broils. Three years later Pope Nicholas III. was engaged in causing France and Castile to cease from war.

We cannot refrain from quoting a passage which occurs at this period of Cardinal Matthieu's history: 'The excesses of the private wars lasted but a short time; those of the civil wars soaked the soil of the whole peninsula in blood. It was under the names of Guelfs and Ghibellines that the rival cities in each province, and the rival factions in each city, carried on their murderous animosities. The impious race of the Hohenstauffen was always busy fanning flames of hatred and fury in the interest of its private ambition. It regarded Italy as its prey; and, provided it reigned, it cared not whether it reigned over ruins

and desolation. Its emissaries were in every place, secretly lighting up the fires of discord in the hearts of great feudal lords; or in towns, or in the midst of the family circle, sowing distrust wherever it found that hatred had died out; and corrupting by artifices and lies the fidelity which was due to the Pope. . . . . The mission of the Papal Legates was everywhere to bring about peace and goodwill amongst men. They proposed just terms to the rival towns who were disputing for a piece of territory, or to the rival factions which regarded their town as the arena for satisfying their thirst for private revenge. Often the Pope's terms were accepted, and then men forgot their mutual rancours in a common peace. But if the negotiations failed, the Legate issued an admonition; and if the parties were obstinate, then excommunication followed the menace; and force was often found to follow the censure of the Pope. For the Legate invited the neighbouring cities to unite for the purpose of reducing to peace that town where factions had broken through all restraints, or where revolt had successfully raised its head. Sometimes a whole province, called by the Church to arms, gave a hope of justice to the oppressed, and forced the oppressor to keep to the path of duty. Somehow a cessation of strife was brought about, and the two towns or the two factions sent their deputies to the Pope to receive the terms of peace.' This authority, or rather supremacy of the Popes, seems to have been fully recognised at the time of Martin V. To use the words of Cardinal Matthieu: 'Le droit public, qui investissait les Papes de cette suprématie, leur donnait aussi le caractère de médiateurs dans les querrelles des princes.'

Towards the end of the thirteenth century, Nicholas IV., by the Treaty of Tarascon, terminated the long quarrel between the Houses of Anjou and Aragon, which had begun with the Sicilian Vespers, had troubled many princely families, and had made South Italy the arena for sanguinary struggles. Europe was at that time shaken by a great war between Philip le Bel, King of France, and Edward I., King of England. The Dukes of Brabant and of Savoy and the Earl of Brittany took part with the former King; and the Kings of Scotland and of Norway aided the British Monarch. Adolf of Nassau, one of the rival claimants for the imperial throne, sided with England; the other claimant, Albert of Austria, fought on the side of France. Pope Boniface VIII. instantly stepped between the combatants and offered mediation; but his offer was rejected. He thereupon cited both parties before his tribunal to answer severally for all their unjust deeds, and published a Bull (A.D. 1296), in which he forbade all men to pay the subsidies towards the war. He also threatened with excommunication every person who attempted to levy the subsidies, and laid under interdict every town which handed the subsidies over to the crown. The King of France replied by decreeing that no payments of money, and no appeal should be carried to the Pope; and that no legate, or messenger, or writing, or message, from the Pope should enter France. The Pope sent a soft answer, which had the effect of turning Philip's anger aside; and then Philip accepted the Pope's offer of mediation. Yet when the Pope's sentence was brought by the Legate, the Comte d'Artois snatched it out of his hand and threw it into the fire; and the King declared that he would not submit to the Pope's judgment.

The next Legate was thrown into prison, in direct violation of the law of nations. The Pope then sent a Bull, '*Ausculta, fili,*' in which he reminded the King that he had to respect justice, and make due reparation for the exactions and violences under which his subjects had suffered. The King's ministers, instead of showing him this Bull, seem to have fabricated another, of such a character that it inflamed the anger of the King and of all France.* The King then called together the estates of the realm (A.D. 1302), and Pierre de Flotte—a lawyer suborned by the King—made an inflammatory address against the Pope. A Council met at Rome on November 1st in that year, when the Bull '*Unam Sanctam*' was promulgated. This Bull unfolded the distinction of the spiritual and temporal powers, and showed the subordination of Kings to the Pope. Philip's rejoinder was a declaration, made in the States-General, that the Pope was a heretic and simonist, and a decree of deposition against the Pope. He then bargained with one of the Colonnas—a Ghibelline—to join with some French conspirators to seize the person of the Pope. The attempt was made at Agnani, on September 7, 1303. As they entered the palace, Pope Boniface calmly put on his pontifical robes and ornaments, and taking the keys in one hand and the crucifix in the other, he sat quietly on his throne, and said: 'I will die as the Vicar of Christ.' The conspirators entered, and spoke to him with the greatest anger and violence. The Pope, turning to the French leader, Nogaret, calmly said: 'Here is my head; here is my neck; Catholic, lawful Pope, and Vicar of Jesus I am; I rejoice at being killed by heretics; I thirst after death for the

* Matthieu.

faith and liberty of the Church.' The Frenchmen trembled and remained speechless; but the Italian, Colonna, struck the Pope in the face with his iron gauntlet. The blood streamed down; but the Pope remained motionless and silent. They then seized him, and for three days gave themselves up to pillage. The peasants, however, flocked into the town. Nogaret escaped in haste; Colonna threw himself at the feet of the Pope, and was pardoned. The Romans then arrived with troops, and conducted the Pope to Rome, amid tears of affection and transports of joy. Sciarra Colonna and Nogaret died in disgrace and exile; Philip le Bel was killed by a fall from his horse; Pierre de Flotte was mangled in battle; and the Comte d'Artois, falling in the same battle, had his right hand cut off and his tongue torn out, by a butcher of Bruges, before he died. That is the story of the mediation which was offered by the Pope to prevent that war between England and France which involved all Europe in calamity.

After Gaveston was killed by Thomas, Duke of Lancaster, grandson of Henry III. (1312), the flames of civil war were lighted up between Edward II. and his barons; but the Pope reconciled the barons and their king. A few years later, the Pope (John XXII.) charged the bishops of Dublin and of Cashel to endeavour to put an end to the revolt in Ireland. The Irish fully acknowledged the Pope's authority, but addressed to him a memoir of their grievances. The Pope in A.D. 1317 wrote to the king in their favour. The king promised, in reply, that the Irish should be no more oppressed, but should be treated with justice and gentleness. Thus ended the war. In the same year, the Pope effected a peace between Edward II. of England

and Robert Bruce of Scotland.* Two subsequent wars between the English and Scotch were also ended by the Pope's Legates. The fruit of this peace-making was that Edward III., when he ascended the throne, appealed to the Pope to give him counsel and advice how to reign well. The Pope's answer is given by Reynaldus (A.D. 1331). The advice was doubtless followed; for Edward III. was one of the greatest of the English kings.

In A.D. 1314, divisions sprang up between the electors to the imperial throne, with regard to the election of a new Emperor; and the war of eight years was kindled between Louis of Bavaria and Frederick of Austria. Pope John XXII. suspended both parties, and commanded that their rights and claims should be fully discussed. If they had obeyed, the bloody battle of Mühldorf (A.D. 1322), which Louis gained over Frederick, would have been avoided.

A few years previously, Pope Clement V. made an attempt to put an end to the sanguinary feud which was ever raging between the Guelfs and Ghibellines; imposing a peace on some of the towns, and a truce or suspension of arms on others. Pope Benedict XII. in 1336 reconciled the Colonnas (Ghibellines) with the Orsinis and the Gaetanis, who were Guelfs. The great feud was at its height in A.D. 1197, at the death of the Emperor Henry VI., and was carried on between Philip, Duke of Suabia, a Ghibelline prince, and Otho, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, a prince of the house of Este-Guelf. For they both contended for the succession. The feud was in reality a struggle concerning the temporal independence of the Head of the Church.

* Rohrbacher.

The names 'Ghibelline' and 'Guelf' were Italian corruptions of the German names of two great families. (1) The *Weiblingen*, originally sprung from the diocese of Augsburg; this family mounted the imperial throne in the person of Conrad II., and descended from it when Frederick II. was deposed. (2) The *Welf*, whose original home was Altorf, and who were subsequently lords of Bavaria. The former family endeavoured to make the Church subordinate to the Emperors, and, like the modern Russian Church, a mere engine of State. The latter family regarded the Head of the Church as supreme over the secular sovereigns of the world. The Ghibellines said generally that matter should be independent of spirit, and therefore specially that the State should not be dependent on the Church. The Guelfs supported the preponderance of the spiritual principle over the temporal, and therefore the subordination of the State to the Church.

The war between these two parties was terrible, because the combatants represented fundamental principles. It was widely extended; for every man in Italy was professedly either Guelf or Ghibelline; and it underlay the question of investitures in every other country. It was this quarrel which was carried on between Innocent II. and Arnoldo da Brescia, the demagogue; and between Alexander III. and the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Arnoldo da Brescia, a disciple of Abelard, demanded a reformation in the Church, and Republicanism in the State; he said that spiritual goods belonged to the Church, while temporal possessions and advantages were in the sole power of secular princes; and that the spiritual power was utterly incompatible with temporal power and temporal

possessions. If he had said that these powers were distinct, he would have been right; but he said they were contradictory. These errors were condemned by the tenth Œcumenical Council (Lateran), and again by the Pope in 1139. Here was the commencement of the great feud of the Guelfs and Ghibellines; and we find throughout the struggle a close connection between the denial of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, and the assertion, in some places, of Cæsarism; while in other places, which were free from the power of the Emperor, the denial of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope was united with the assertion of the sovereignty of the people and the Republican form of government. This was the case when Arnoldo's followers took Rome in A.D. 1142. As soon as they became straitened in that city, they appealed to the Emperor Conrad to help them, promising that they would extend his empire and make his rule universal. 'Down with every one who resists Cæsar!' then became their cry. The war of the Guelfs and Ghibellines was carried on in the times of Gregory XIII., and was terminated by Pope Sixtus V. in 1585. It is perhaps superfluous to remind our readers that our own royal family is Guelf; and it is a curious circumstance that the distinctive mark of the Guelfs is preserved in the cocked hat of our Privy Councillors; for the badge on the cocked hat is carried at the right-hand side, while the Ghibellines always made a point of putting the feather on the left side of their hats.

No. XV.

DURING the reign of Clement VI., who was the greatest monarch of his time, war was declared between Edward III. of England and Philip VI. of France; and one of the first acts of the Pope was to labour to prevent bloodshed and bring about a peace. For Louis of Bavaria had made an offensive alliance with the King of England and with the Princes of Flanders, conspiring with them to make war on France. Such an alliance was unjust, and contrary to law; because it was not necessary for each of these Powers, in self-defence and the support of right. The Pope immediately examined into the case, and passed judgment upon it, anathematising Louis, the instigator of the plot (A.D. 1346). This timely severity seems to have had the desired effect. Three years later, according to Reynaldus, King Louis of Hungary claimed the kingdom of Naples as his own, and levied war in order to obtain it. The Pope at once went minutely into the merits of the claim, reviewing carefully every point. He then ordered the King of Hungary to retire from the war. Dissensions broke out the same year between the Genoese and the Venetians. This dispute also was judged by the Pope, and war was prevented.

Gregory XI. ascended the throne in 1370. A war was imminent between France and England. The Pope offered to judge the case, but his offer was spurned and bloodshed ensued. He succeeded, however, in making

peace between the King of Castille and Ferdinand, King of Portugal. Soon afterwards he reconciled Castille with Navarre and Arragon; and put an end to the strife between Sicily and the kingdom of Naples. In the year 1436, the Portuguese projected a war against the Moors of Tangier. Pope Eugenius IV. gave the matter a careful consideration in council, and then wrote: 'The contemplated war would be just and therefore permissible, so far as Portugal should be compelled to make it for self-preservation. Otherwise it would be unjust and damnable.' The Portuguese rushed into the unjust war, but were defeated, and the Infante Ferdinand was led captive by the Tangerines.

The battle of Bosworth was fought in 1485, between Richard III. and Henry VII. The latter, who was the victor, prayed Pope Innocent VII. to confirm his succession to the throne. The Pope investigated his claim, and issued a Bull in the succeeding year, confirming Henry's succession, and anathematising any one who should venture to stir up again the strife between the White and Red Roses, to which the marriage of Henry with the daughter of Edward IV. offered a happy termination. This Bull is given at length in Bacon's history.

When Alexander VI. came to the throne (1492), Charles VIII., King of France, was making an expedition to vindicate, against Ferdinand, King of Naples, the rights of the House of Anjou to that kingdom. It was a fief of the Pope's. The Pope therefore demanded, both as Suzerain and also as Head of the Church, to judge between the claims of the Houses of Anjou and of Arragon. Charles VIII., however, would not acknowledge the right of the Pope in either capacity; but con-

quered first Rome and then Naples. The Pope made peace with Charles, giving him the towns of Civita Vecchia and Terracina, but refusing to give him the investiture of the kingdom of Naples. Charles soon became so hated for his tyrannies that the whole country rose, and he had to retire in haste, relinquishing all his conquests.

At the same period Spain and Portugal had a serious quarrel about their respective possessions in the new world. Emmanuel was the King of Portugal; Ferdinand and Isabella reigned in Spain. Cardinal Ximenes and Gonsalvez da Cordova, and Admiral Diaz and Vasco di Gama, were the men whose respective countries were about to enter upon a war. Yet these two great nations consented to refer their actual quarrel and their potential dissensions to the arbitration of the Head of the Church, in order that interminable wars might thereby be precluded. Pope Alexander VI., having investigated the case, published the Bull '*Inter cætera*,' which traced a meridian line in South America, and awarded to the Spaniards all the territory to the east of that line, and to the Portuguese all to the west. The two nations on receipt of the Bull laid aside their swords, and agreed that they would never let ambition tempt them to cross the line which the Pope had traced. Shortly afterwards the Pope confirmed to Spain her conquests in Algiers and Tunis; and to Portugal her conquests in Fez and Morocco.

The Bull '*In cœnâ Domini*' was promulgated by the same Pope. The third article excommunicates all pirates, and the masters and crews of all vessels of war which cruise without a due commission or letter of marque from their sovereign. Article 5 excommuni-

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cates every ruler, who imposes new taxes or increases old taxes, except in cases provided for by the Constitution of the country; or, in unforeseen contingencies, by dispensation from the Holy See. If this Bull, says De Maistre, had been honestly accepted by rulers, it would in time have established a European police to enforce a just and unvarying code of international law.

In 1550 Pope Julius III. endeavoured to establish peace between Charles V. and King Henry II. of France. It was reserved for Pope Clement VIII. to mediate successfully between France and Spain, and to secure peace by the Treaty of Vervins (A.D. 1598). Sixty-nine years later, Pope Clement IX. again succeeded in reconciling those two great nations.

We have now come down to a period when, under the name of Reform, an atheistical philosophy widely supplanted sound doctrine; and when the spirit of Revolution which pervaded the masses, while a false philosophy was preached by the learned, lessened the authority of legitimate rulers, and caused the higher authority of the Church to be despised. When, a little more than a year ago, the political horizon was threatening, and a sanguinary war between two great military nations was preparing, the Pope, who now sits upon the throne, sent briefs to the rulers of those nations, offering to judge the quarrel and mediate between them. The German King received the offer with empty courtesy; the French Emperor deemed it unworthy of notice; of the people, some were silent, some uttered a passing sneer at that which had so often, in more savage times, allayed rancour and discord, and stopped the effusion of blood. What was the consequence? The French Emperor is no more than a

by-word among the people. Both nations have groaned under the heavy blows of war. They have awaked from the madness of their revelry; and, still reeling from its effects, they ask each other whether they cannot devise some Court of Arbitration to determine their quarrels without the shedding of blood; or some great Federal Government which shall preserve the nations of Europe in everlasting concord. But they are digging for themselves cisterns which will not hold water. Let them resort to the well which our Lord has dug, to that Church which He has built; for there, and there only, can they find peace.

Let them turn to the annals of their own and other countries. From the fourth to the end of the sixteenth century, we perceive, in the pictures which history has handed down to us, the Pope always pourtrayed as a Colossus of moral power, standing up amid a jarring world of littlenesses and vice. We witness him interposing to stay the hand of the victor, and save the vanquished from vengeance. We see him declaring justice, judging the quarrels of monarchs, arresting the revenge of individuals, putting a stop to the practice of duelling, and restraining the increase of taxation and the multiplication of customs-dues in all countries. We see him fostering the Guilds which prevented cheating and adulterations in trade, and promoted fair dealing and religious observances in the mercantile class. We are struck with the vast mind of St. Gregory VII. as he worked to restore society, and was busy in reviving the practice of public penances; in forbidding the worst criminals, as a penance, from marrying; or in taking away from them their connubial and their civil rights, until they were reformed. We

ever find the Popes in history as a protection for the weak against the strong, for the poor against the nobles, for the people against powerful monarchs. We perceive the Church as a vast society, comprehending within her bosom all the other kingdoms and every other society, which professed to be Christian. We find her issuing corrective and punitive decrees to kingdoms, provinces, and towns, regarding them as societies subordinate to the Church. As the secular government of the kingdom existed, in those days, over corporations or municipalities, which were independent of each other, and were in fact separate Republics subordinate to the king's rule; so was every nation a local autonomy or local government, under the authority of the Head of the Church.

If it be urged in objection that all this was necessary in those days, because society had fallen low and become decrepit and degraded; then we reply that it certainly was necessary then, and that it alone could have raised society to a healthy and high condition. We say, moreover, that since this system has become impaired through the spread of the so-called Reformation, society has again been falling, and becoming more and more degraded. As the Jews of old refused the government of God, in order to put themselves, according to the principle of Cæsarism, under the caprices of men; so has society for three hundred years been going backwards, ever since it has resisted the supremacy and spiritual rule of Christ's Church. To save society there is but one remedy, that which Jesus, the Healer, devised; that which saved the world at the break-up of the Roman Empire.

No. XVI.

Let us try to look dispassionately and without prejudice at the whole question. In order to cut off the bias of interest and the agitation of passion—in order to divest ourselves of the tyranny of custom and get out of our habitual grooves of thought—let us imagine ourselves gazing at this world, as the beings of another planet would gaze down at it. Let us picture to ourselves a great multitude of men, scattered over a vast extent of country, each seeking his own ends, with no law, divine or human, moral or spiritual, to sway them or restrain them, and with no principles in common, and no maxims which all accept as true and binding. Such a multitude would not be a society. It would be merely a herd of separate and warring atoms, and no more. But if man, as Aristotle avers, is a social or political animal, then we must conclude that this vast multitude would be a crowd of beasts, not of men. Such a condition of things could therefore never have actually existed. Yet a people may approach nearer and nearer to such a state, as the component individuals become more and more like beasts; although it may never actually attain to it.

Looking down from our planet, let us watch the first step towards forming a society out of these jarring atoms. We see a number of families. The multitude now consists of numerous little knots of persons. Each knot is at one. It is a unity; for each knot of persons

is governed; it lives under a ruler and obeys a law, and has a common end, which is the good of all that family or unit. The ruler or head of the family issues his orders, or makes his laws, with this end in view; (if he be a ruler, I say, and not a despot; for a despot seeks only his own good; and then there would be no unity—no family; or, in other words, we should not be looking at the first step towards forming a society, according to our hypothesis). Now these numerous knots, into which the multitude of men is segregated, acknowledge no law over all, and have no end in common. The various ends of all these families may clash and be antagonistic. These families, then, are now the warring atoms which we have to bring into harmony, union, or peace, in order to progress still farther towards the formation of society.

Let us then look on, while a farther step is being accomplished. We see numbers of families here and there assembling and living together in towns. The community or town is one; for it has a government, and acknowledges a ruler, and obeys laws framed in order to the attainment of one end, namely, the common good of the whole community or town. If a town were divided between the opposing interests or clashing ends of two or more families, it would not be a unity, and we should not be looking at the second step towards the formation of a society, in accordance with our hypothesis; we should still be looking at the first step out of barbarism, or rather brutality. The persons composing each town or community are, then, under one code of laws, which laws have been framed with a view to a common end; and the town is altogether under one ruler, whose power or authority is

without appeal, and who expounds and enforces those laws. The multitude has now been segregated or crystallised into a large number of communes or towns. But these towns do not all acknowledge the same code of laws, nor do they seek one end in common. The various ends of these towns are antagonistic and clashing. The towns, then, are now the warring atoms; as the towns of the Italian republics used to be.

Let us scrutinise the next step, and see these towns or communes coalesce into nations. Our hypothesis now is, that those towns have united into larger bodies, which call themselves kingdoms or states. The towns which compose each state are now no longer at war; they now no longer have in view opposing or antagonistic ends, nor support interests which clash with those of other towns. If they did so, then the third step would not have been taken; they would have reached only the second step above brutality. All the towns in each state are therefore under one law, and acknowledge one supreme ruler, and aim at one end—the common good of the whole state.

Let us proceed a step farther: 'Friend, come up a little higher.' As the towns have been united to produce a state—which is a higher advance in civilisation, and secures more good for all, more peace, more harmony, more strength, more of all things necessary for life—why should we not advance a little higher, and unite the states so as to produce a Christian commonwealth? This would be a still farther advance in civilisation, and would secure more good things for all the world, more peace, harmony, strength, and everything needful for life on earth, as well as for the life beyond the grave. To take this last step would be

precisely that which we have been urging in these papers.

What we have now to remark concerning the 'common end' will apply as well to the family, as to the towns, to nations, and to the Catholic commonwealth. We are speaking of the common end of any society, large or small. The ultimate end of one society may be health of body; that of another, health of mind; that of another may be wealth—of which we may give England for an example; for with us English the acquisition of money is everything, and political economy is the peculiar science of the statesman. The ultimate end of another society may be force or military power—the laws of Sparta, for example, were all made in order to reduce men to be merely parts of a military machine. Unity, however, we have not mentioned as an end. For where unity has been lost, the society has been *ipso facto* broken up into a number of societies of the next lower grade; the society has taken a step backwards towards barbarism or brutality. We have, moreover, been speaking of the *ultimate* end of a society. For every society may have many ends, if all these various ends are subordinate to the ultimate end of the society; that is, if they are means towards the ultimate end. Thus, for example, the ultimate end of England is wealth; the science of means for attaining that end is political economy; and the secular education which men have sought for as their end, and which we have lately established, is one of the means to wealth—it is the way to obtain clerks for the counting-house. Similarly the monastic life is but means to an end—namely, where the ultimate end is a spiritual life or a continual communion with God.

We are far from saying that the ultimate end of every society should be the same. It is quite right that the ultimate end of a subordinate society should be subordinate to the common good of the whole society. The ultimate end of every joint-stock company is wealth. That is quite right; but it must be subordinate to the ultimate end of the whole society, which should be godliness. The company is, as a society, subordinate to the nation; just as the nation is subordinate to the Christian commonwealth. By the term subordinate we denote an end which is a means to a farther end. The joint-stock company seeks to encourage production as its immediate end. But it produces for the sake of wealth, which is its ultimate end. Yet every member of that company should say that he seeks to bear his share in producing, not because production is the 'Be-all and the End-all here,' but because the 'sweat of the brow'—of one kind or another—is part of his higher end or duty of godliness.

Now let us apply this to our larger society—the Christian commonwealth. In these considerations we have doubtless had in mind some nation. Let us now pass in review the same considerations, while we keep in view the society of all the nations of the world. The ultimate end of this—the largest, the highest, the Catholic society—must be the highest or ultimate end of man; not of the Englishman only, nor of the Frenchman only, nor of the negro only, but of all men. To this end, according to our former reasoning, the ends of all smaller societies must be subordinate. And the ruler of this society must be the administrator, and expounder, and enforcer—if we may coin a

word—of the supreme law—that divine law which, even according to Cicero, is over all men. He must be sovereign over this largest society; he must be supreme over all other societies; and the rulers of the latter must be subordinate to him, as their societies are subordinate to the largest society, and as the ends of their societies are subordinate to that highest, that ultimate end of man. This is all that, in the previous papers, we have urged.

Yet there are some remarks which, in order to guard against misconception, we must make on the above considerations.

We do not mean that society grew up out of a herd of brutes rather than men. Such a notion of the 'natural state' of man is utterly untrue; it is contradicted both by history and by revelation. Neither, consequently, do we assert that society was ever actually formed by these successive steps. The logical sequence is not often the natural sequence. The world never consisted of fourteen or more separate mineral elements, which were gradually oxydised and mingled so as to form soil and rocks, and then plants, and then animals. Yet, when chemistry is taught, the learner begins by a consideration of the simple elements. The functions of the mind never existed as separate things; yet he who would attain to a knowledge of the human mind must begin by studying the passions, the imagination, the judgment, and so forth. So we say that the first simple element of society is the family, because this is the simplest form of government; and that without government there is no society; and that men in such a case would be little better than brutes. We say also that the next form of society is the com-

munity, because this is the next or more organised form of government; and that the next form, which is still more organised and therefore more perfect, is the state; and that the last or most perfect form is the Christian commonwealth of nations. But each form consists of the preceding or lower forms in combination; just as, in the natural world, every higher organisation is not the destruction but the combination of the lower forms of organisation. To destroy the family therefore, for example, would render impossible all larger communities, the state, and the Christian commonwealth.

No. XVII.

It is possible that some persons may have misapprehended our meaning, and may have assumed that we regard the supreme rule of the Pope as arising from his infallibility. In fact, politicians have, in wilful ignorance, asserted that, 'if we admit the doctrine of infallibility, we must recognise the Pontiff's right to depose sovereigns, and release their people from their oaths of fidelity.' We reply: (1) If a doctor's judgment in all matters of health were sure to be correct, could we justly raise the objection, and say, 'If we admit the correctness of his judgment, we thereby recognise his right to depose poor-law guardians and officers of health'? Assuredly not; these are two distinct things. The doctor's unerring skill may cause him to pronounce a true judgment on all sanitary matters, and all wise men would pay entire deference to his judgment. But, to depose guardians and officers of health, an authority is required, and a legal power to do so must be acknowledged.

(2) If this argument availed anything in refutation of the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope, it would equally avail to refute the infallibility of Œcumenical Councils of the Church; for Councils have before now deposed sovereigns and absolved subjects from their oaths of fidelity—*e.g.* the Council of Lyons, under Innocent IV., deposed the Emperor Frederick II.

(3) The whole Church has, for many centuries, re-

cognised the infallibility of the Pope's *ex cathedrâ* judgments in faith and morals (as the records of provincial councils in all parts of the world sufficiently testify). Yet no one has yet found this universal belief to have been injurious to the secular authority. How, then, has such a belief suddenly become injurious in the year 1869?

The present Pontiff, in answering the address of a deputation from the Academy of the Catholic Religion (July 21, 1871), used these words: 'There are many errors regarding the infallibility; but the most malicious of all is that which includes, in that dogma, the right of deposing sovereigns and declaring the people no longer bound by the obligation of fidelity. This right has now and again, in critical circumstances, been exercised by the Pontiffs; but it has nothing to do with Papal infallibility. Its origin was not the infallibility, but the authority of the Pope. This authority—in accordance with public right, which was then vigorous, and with the acquiescence of all Christian nations, who reverenced, in the Pope, the supreme judge of the Christian Commonwealth—extended so far as to pass judgment, even in civil affairs, on the acts of princes and of nations. But the present state of things is widely different; and it can be only malice which confuses together such different matters and different times, assuming that the infallible judgment of the Pope, concerning a principle of revelation, has any affinity with a right which the Popes, in accordance with the express desire of the people, had to exercise whenever the common good required it.'

Here the Holy Father explains two points: (1) the origin whence the right has flowed; and (2) the

cause which rendered its exercise useful in former time. (1) The origin was not the infallibility of the Pope in matters of morals and faith, but the authority of the Pope as supreme ruler of the Christian commonwealth. He, it is true, inflicted a punishment in the exercise of this right. But a punishment is an act of the coercitive power, and supposes, not infallibility, but authority in him who exercises it. We never say that a judge may not punish, unless he is infallible in judging; but we say that he may, or rather must, punish if he has authority to sit in judgment. A Pope punishes—he has a right and duty to punish—because he is the supreme ruler of the Church of Christ. It is also true that he can deliver, *ex cathedrâ*, a true judgment in matters of faith and morals; because of our Lord's promise to His Church, and because of the very being of the Church. But these two things are distinct, although not separate. The former right is not the same as the latter power, although they meet in the successor of St. Peter, the Head of Christ's commonwealth.

That they are distinct has always been acknowledged. The Gallicans denied the infallibility, but recognised the Pope's right to punish princes whenever they abused their civil power. Thus Gerson: 'All men, princes and others, are subject to the Pope, in so far as they might choose to make a bad use of their jurisdictions, temporality, and dominion in contravention of the divine and natural law; and that superiority may be termed directive and ordinative rather than civil.'*

* 'Omnes homines, principes et alii, subjectionem habeñt ad Papam, in quantum eorum jurisdictionibus, temporalitate, et dominio abuti vellent contra legem Divinam et naturalem;

The following passage occurs in the sentence of Pope Innocent IV. on the Emperor Frederick II., after an enumeration of the Emperor's various crimes: 'We declare that the above-named Prince, who has rendered himself unworthy of the imperial throne and of the burdens of royalty, and indeed of every honour and dignity of every kind, has been rejected by God for his crimes, so that he is no longer either Emperor or King. We denounce him, and declare him to be bound by his sins and rejected of God, and deprived by the Lord of every honour and dignity. We therefore, through our *apostolical authority*, deprive him by this our sentence, and we absolve for ever from their oaths all those who have sworn fealty to him, prohibiting absolutely every one from rendering obedience to him as Emperor or King; and we desire that every one who in future shall assist him or give counsel to him in that character, shall be *ipso facto* excommunicate.' Also in St. Gregory VII.'s sentence of suspension against Henry IV. of Germany, the act of imposing the punishment was stated to rest on the Pope's authority as the head of the Christian commonwealth, or the Viceregent of God.

(2) Pope Pius IX. explained the cause which, in former times, rendered the exercise of this right so useful. It was, that every one in those days recognised the Pontiff as the Supreme Judge, even in civil affairs, of princes and nations. It would be a happy thing if people in these days also preferred a just judgment to frauds, intrigues, and battle-fields bedewed with blood.

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et potest superioritas illa nominari *directiva* et *ordinativa* potius quam civilis.' (*Serm. de Pac. et Unit. Gall.* consid. v.)

But this is not the cause of the deposition of sovereigns. In fifty years we have seen more sovereigns deposed than the Popes deposed in 1500 years. Who has deposed sovereigns in these latter times? The Revolution. The Revolution, then, has assumed the right to judge and discrown princes, and has taken to itself the function of supreme ruler, in the Christian commonwealth, over nations and kings. What enabled the Revolution to take to itself this great power and authority? The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; the prevailing principles of unbridled liberty; the denial of all social order and lawful authority. It was these maxims which made—and which still make—every throne to totter. But the infallibility of the Pope is the strongest support to the throne, wherever the sovereign power is used to support right. The 63d Art. of the Syllabus condemns the maxim that 'it is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and even to rebel against them.'

But, it may be said, speaking as a politician and not as a Catholic, why do you say that the Pope should have a supreme rule over the commonwealth of Christ, any more than the Revolution? We have given, as an example, one great evil which afflicts the world, and have shown that it can be remedied only by such a supremacy as we have described. The same argument may be repeated in reference to every other evil which afflicts the world. Or let us take a general view of affairs, and go below the surface and see whence all these evils spring. In a general view of society, what do we find? A great progress in material comforts, it is true; the sciences and arts enlisted in the service of rendering life pleasant, and extending the sweets of

dissipation, even to the poorer classes. But in moral things there has been a serious retrogression; public and private morals have been declining; family and domestic ties have become utterly slack; youths run wild at will, and the public spurns at all authority; the literature of the day disseminates materialism and atheism; murders, suicides, thefts, frauds, and immoralities are numerous; science multiplies the means of destruction, and governments increase the numbers of their armies; religion is despised, families are disintegrated, individuals become frivolous and degraded. Society is, in fact, becoming dissolved. In former times it was through impulse or passion that men sinned, whether publicly or privately; but the mind was sane; they knew they were sinning, and every one else perceived that it was sin, and called crimes by the right names. Now, men prevaricate through degradation of intellect. They are surprised and offended if you tell them they are criminals. They will not believe that they have sinned; and other men have ceased to call their acts by their proper names. An adultery is a 'conquest;' a lie is 'another version;' a piratical expedition is called 'putting on a moral pressure;' robbery on a grand scale is 'annexation;' fraud by a whole nation is 'repudiation;' a multiplication of murders is called 'war,' or a 'military operation,' or 'military glory.' Men's thoughts have become corrupt and are in the darkness of error: and 'My people have been silent because they had no knowledge.' These times have been described by Osee.

The disease of society arises from error. But the remedy cannot come from philosophers, or from human science, because philosophers themselves are diseased

and cannot rightly see. It was they, indeed, who produced and spread the disease by their rebellion against God, and against His Vicar upon earth. There is, moreover, this difference between bodily and mental diseases: a bodily disease is at once known, because it causes discomfort to the mind; but the man whose mind is diseased does not perceive it, for the disease causes self-satisfaction and pride. The only remedy, therefore, for a nation diseased, is to be found in divine science, which comes to the mind from without, which is imposed on the mind, and clears it from error and diseased vision. But this requires a promulgator and interpreter in constant activity. And thus it is that the definition of the dogma of the Papal infallibility was the only possible remedy for society. Yet statesmen have opposed this remedy. 'The light has come into the world, but men have loved darkness rather than the light, because their deeds were evil.'

No. XVIII.

Some of our readers may have put aside the idea which we have endeavoured to impress upon them, with the preliminary objection that it may be the idea of a theologian, but could never become the policy of a statesman. Let us ask them, in return, to consider what is the meaning of the word 'politics.' Is it the art of increasing the wealth of a nation? Is it the art of making a nation glorious by means of military achievements?—or is it the art of altogether improving men—or, in other words, raising them physically and spiritually?

Every political government has an exterior form, about which we do not greatly care; and it has an essential form, which is the subject of our considerations. The former has reference to some of its secondary ends, the latter to its ultimate end. The art of political government, which is based, as the name denotes, on the science of citizenship, deals with the material advantages of men, but much more with their spiritual benefits. It involves the use of the former as means towards the attainment of the latter.

We say that it is based on a science; for every art is based on science. The learner of a speculative science has to study only physical or metaphysical facts. In practical science, the student, having learned natural principles, applies his mind to turning those principles to practical account. The art, which is based upon the practical science, teaches him how to attain his end by

the use of means. Thus, the art of politics is based upon the study of man as a member of the various kinds of society, and teaches how those societies are to be regulated, and how men are to be managed and directed to their good. The practical science of politics has been defined by St. Thomas Aquinas as 'the principal science and the architect of all sciences, since it takes cognisance of the ultimate and perfect good in all human affairs.' The speculative science of politics consists of the knowledge of the first principles of social union in the mind and will, so that the natural instincts of man for happiness may be completely satisfied.

The grounds of these definitions may be shortly stated as follows: Every animal is furnished by nature with the means of procuring what is necessary for itself individually; but man is not so furnished. Man, instead of this, is placed by nature in society, as a sufficient means of satisfying his far larger and higher wants, and procuring him every good. Political science must therefore teach how the end of society may be attained; and this can be learned only when the principles of union are known.

There are, however, many kinds of society, each of which is ordered towards some end which is considered beneficial to life; but a state is ordered to the end of providing all that is necessary to man's temporal existence, or his life on earth. And the most perfect society is that which is ordered to the end that man should have sufficiently all that is necessary to his whole being. This is the most perfect society possible; because the end is man's highest good, or the sum of all that is good for him. Such a society is the Church, or

Christian commonwealth. There are, therefore, Christian politics and State politics; just as there is also a municipal economy and a domestic economy or management.

It is plain, from what we have laid down, that practical political science is subordinate to moral science. Yet Kant and the German Rationalists deny this, and sacrifice, in consequence, what is good to what is pleasant, the honourable to the useful, and justice to statutory enactments. Their political science—in other words, all modern political science—has therefore become a material system, because it has been separated from natural right. These teachers confine the science of morals to the actions of the individual, while they assert that social action is the subject of politics. Thus right or justice is, in their view, not the same for an individual and for a nation; according to them it is wrong for a man to murder, but not criminal for a nation to enter upon an unjust war; a man may not steal, but a nation is justified in seizing a neighbour's territory or in repudiating its own debts. Man's external actions and internal actions—if we may coin the expression—are thus put into different categories, and the nation or state is separated from the individual. We need hardly remind our readers of the condemnations in the Syllabus of the following false propositions: 'The state, as being the origin and fountain of all rights, possesses a certain right of its own, circumscribed by no limits.' 'There is no necessity that human laws should be conformed to the law of nature, or receive from God their obligatory force.' 'All moral discipline and virtue should be accounted to consist in accumulating and increasing wealth by every method,

and in satiating the desires of pleasure.' 'Right consists in the mere material fact; and all the duties of man are an empty name; and all human facts have the force of right.' 'The successful injustice of a fact brings with it no detriment to the sanctity of right.' 'A violation of any most sacred oath, or any wicked and flagitious action which is repugnant to the eternal law, is not only not to be reprobated, but is even altogether lawful, and to be extolled with the highest praise, when it is done for love of country.'

Let us consider for a moment how sciences can be separate. The fundamental principles, which are common to them, once formed a single science. But as men progressed in knowledge this science came to be studied by different men, in its different parts or branches. Thus each branch was developed and carried on, and came to be regarded as a separate science. It is, however, not really separate, although it is distinct, for it is subordinate. Thus morals and practical politics are not separate sciences; the latter is subordinate to the former. Political science may, in fact, be said to be the application and development of the principles of ethics in the most extended and complicated relations. Its first step is, therefore, to direct the mind to the ultimate good of man, which is the end or final cause of political science. This is essential and not accidental to every society; for it is the end of every society; and where this essential end is not preserved there is no political science, however much the subordinate ends or accidental parts of society may be developed.

Now the preservation of all the social relations, by which the natural law binds together the various mem-

bers of a society, is of course an essential end of the society. The knowledge of these bonds, and of the natural law itself, belongs to moral science. Therefore political or social science is subordinate to moral science. Let us give an example: the desire for preservation and the desire for propagation are natural instincts of man. These two laws of nature and their consequences are studied in Ethics. We thus arrive at the ideas of family, and of the essential inequality of its members; and also at the idea of property. But if we do not start from moral principles then we arrive at notions of 'equality' and Communism. From the study of the family we rise, by a similar process, to the consideration of larger societies. But unless we begin from moral principles we cannot know the essence of the family, nor, consequently, that of the state. Without moral science no one can have a knowledge of politics.

We may proceed farther, and ask, What is the efficient cause of the essential good of a civil society? It is that which is the only guarantee of right or justice; namely, religion. Therefore, the first duty in the art of governing is the preservation and increase of the power of religion in the hearts of all the governed. The ruler must ever keep his eye fixed on the ultimate end of man, and must know the means appointed by the Creator for arriving at it. The government must aim at the ultimate, and facilitate the proximate good of each citizen; because to this end does man live in society and submit to rule, and for this end do the bases of the state exist in the family, which is, therefore, 'the germ of the state.' Now every citizen must tend to spiritual good as his ultimate end; and therefore his spiritual good must be the work of society and

the aim of the government. But to separate the material or external part of man from his internal or spiritual part, and to say that the former alone is the subject of politics, while the latter has nothing to do with politics, is, as we have seen, a grievous error. It is moreover contrary to common sense, for a man cannot be happy if his spiritual part is unhappy. He cannot say: 'The same thing makes me politically happy and spiritually unhappy.' What is here said of each man is true also of the state: '*non aliunde beata est civitas, aliunde homo; quum aliud civitas non est quàm concors hominum multitudo,*' says St. Augustine in his treatise on the *Commonwealth of God.* For a man, in becoming a citizen, does not cease to be a man. He becomes a man and something more; he adds the duties of a citizen to his separate duties as a man. As an individual man he is impelled, by his instinct for happiness which is a force of nature, to a spiritual good as his ultimate end. But as a citizen he should aid others, and should himself obtain aid from society in pursuing this ultimate good. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, in his treatise *De Regimine:* 'But since man, living according to virtue, has his life ordered towards his ultimate end, which is the fruition of God, as we have already shown; so the whole society must have the same ultimate end as one man. Therefore, the ultimate end of the whole society is not to live in accordance with virtue, but, by means of a virtuous life, to attain to the fruition of God.'

No. XIX.

It is the interest of the civil authority not to lose sight of the ultimate end of man. If it does, it must confine its aim to some subordinate end, perhaps some material benefit. It will then be apt to pass laws or make regulations repugnant to the ultimate end. Its subjects will in such a case be constrained either to disobey God, or else the enactments of their ruler. If they successfully disobey their ruler, they learn to set his government at defiance. Even Valerius Maximus asserted, that 'our polity teaches us to make everything give way at all times to religion, even those things wherein the honour of the sovereign majesty is involved.' Yet such a maxim cannot be followed, with safety to the state, except civil politics be kept in subordination to Christian politics, and the state is subordinate to the Christian commonwealth, and the head of the one to the head of the other.

If we admit that the civil government should restrict its view to a mere temporal good, yet it is hard to say what temporal advantage should be the end of the state. Should it be wealth? Or military glory? Or external greatness? Yet these things do not combine together, and they are, moreover, not lasting. If you would have wealth, you must not embark on military enterprises; if you aim at external greatness, you cannot grovel in trade and money-getting. One of these may be the temporal end of the state, but not all of

them; for no society can aim at conflicting or repugnant ends. But not one of them can be an adequate end for a state; for not one of them is lasting; they are all fleeting; and yet the social end of a state, which is to be enduring, must itself be something permanent. And what can be permanent among a people except the love and honouring of virtue, goodness, nobleness? A nation whose end is to do God's will, will educate its children so that they shall have the same aim; and that nation will endure. It must therefore be the object of every ruler to lead the nation to aim at God's will as its end.

But how can a ruler know, in every case, what is God's will, unless he hears and obeys a living Church, whose head shall interpret the moral law, and judge acts, and determine controversies? Thus again we arrive at the conclusion that every ruler owes obedience to the appointed and authoritative head of Christ's Church. If this is not true, what is the alternative? Naturalism. But a natural religion—a God of nature, who does not rule the world—is not sufficient to solve our perplexing political problem. Moreover, it is false to assert that 'all action of God on mankind and on the world is to be denied.' It is also false to suppose that 'human reason, without any regard whatever being had to God, is the one judge of truth and falsehood, of good and bad.' These fundamental maxims of our opponents have been condemned in the Syllabus. Besides, it stands to reason, that their utilitarian politics, which leave each man to judge of what is right, are no more than universal anarchy. Anarchy, which all condemn in name, means a deficiency of rule, a want of sufficient guidance. If each man is free to judge of what is right or wrong, and of what is good or bad for men, then

where can a government of those men reside? The governing authority—the ruler who is to steer the nation and maintain its unity of operation—has no longer a moral power or authority; and therefore it must resort to physical force, in order to secure obedience. Yet the subjects have physical force on their side, and are sure to rebel, unless the ruler is always ready to satisfy their caprices. And why should they not rebel, if their ruler has abjured all moral authority? How then can a ruler govern, when the obedience of his subjects comes merely from fear, and not from moral authority? He must assiduously set one party against another, keeping the parties evenly balanced, and inflaming their jealousies and rivalry. This is the old maxim of '*Divide et impera*,' which was in vogue before the Church was instituted. Such a ruler must, in fact, 'divide the kingdom against itself.' This is called 'party government.' It is a pagan institution. Such a 'kingdom cannot stand.'

But if you do not act on the pagan maxim, the only other alternative is to resort to Christian politics. The ruler must be in subordination to the Head of the Church; he must rule a province in God's commonwealth, and so provide for the moral and religious good of his subjects. He will then stand on another and a firmer base, and will rule by a moral and religious authority; and his subjects will obey, not from fear, but as owning the agent or minister whom God has set over them.

This is no new fancy. All nations once acknowledged the Catholic Church, and were therefore united in a common spiritual end. They formed but one society called the Catholic Church, or *Civitas Dei*,—

the commonwealth of God. The ruler of each nation had the duty of guiding his subjects to what is true and honest. The true and honest was then the same to all nations; for there was one who judged and declared, and they all heard and obeyed. This united them. They were all parts of the one, holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church; and so they were at one.

Yet each nation retained its being, its internal authority, its subordinate ends, under that one bond of union which joined them in harmony. This was so as long as they subordinated every social and temporal good to the infinite good of all. The action of the State was under the guidance of the Church; and so the subjects could obey two masters—the State and the Church—because the two were at one, the former being subordinate to the latter. The independence of each nation was, in this manner, not lost; nor should it be lost. No superior society may destroy or hamper the subordinate societies within it, even when the ends of the latter are heterogeneous to the end of the superior society; unless they tend to hinder its unity by obstructing the attainment of that superior end. To destroy the smaller societies within it, unless they sin as we have said, would amount to preventing its members from procuring for themselves some benefit which the larger society cannot or does not procure for them. The head of the state should therefore not seek to destroy the smaller communities within it (self-government); nor should the government of a town infringe upon the rights of the smaller societies (families) within it. So also the Head of the commonwealth of God does not seek to destroy the nations or states within the fold of the Church, although his end is purely spi-

ritual and eternal, and their immediate end is material and temporal. He seeks merely to keep their ends in subordination to the ultimate spiritual end, so that they may not destroy the unity of the commonwealth under his rule. He has therefore to watch and declare what aids and what obstructs the attainment of the ultimate end of man.

This is what we mean by a superior authority. It is a ruler who subordinates the workings of inferior authorities, towards an end which is higher and beyond the ends which they severally have in view. He is a superior authority only inasmuch as he directs the workings or actions of the others. Thus, in the case under consideration, the inferior authorities, or the rulers of states, are sovereign or independent in all which is not repugnant to that highest ultimate end of all men. The Pope has therefore to direct men, individually and as nations, to their supernatural end, and has to judge their acts individually and collectively, and declare when they are inordinate or repugnant to that end. No action of man or nation can be devoid of a moral character; it is either just or unjust, either good or bad; it either tends to the ultimate end or it does not. The ultimate end is therefore the test, or the standard by which all acts of men and of states must be tried.

Thus and thus only can social order be secured. For social order means a subordination of all acts to the rule of justice or right. It does not merely mean a harmony of action of all the members of the society, but a harmony of action in the attainment of the ultimate end. So that every social good is subordinate to the chief good of man.

All this argument depends, it will be observed, on

the doctrine that the Church on earth is a visible society. This was denied by Wicliffe, and afterwards by Luther and others, who said that each man received within himself a sufficient guidance of the Holy Ghost, and could therefore determine for himself what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad. They were the parents of naturalism. But the Council of Constance, in condemning the articles of Wicliffe, used these words: 'As the spirit of man is to his body, and the province of the spirit to the province of the body, so in the same ratio is the spiritual or ecclesiastical judge to the civil or temporal judge, and the sphere of the one to the sphere of the other.' (*App.* xxiii. art. xii.) St. Thomas Aquinas said (*Sum. Theol.*, pars ii.): 'The secular power is subordinate to the spiritual power as the body is to the soul.' Again: 'Those in whom is invested the care of proximate ends must always be subject to him who is invested with the care of the ultimate end. . . . . But the ministry of this kingdom, seeing that spiritual things are distinct from the things of this earth, is not committed to earthly kings, but to the priesthood, and chiefly to the chief priest, the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff,—to whom all kings of the Christian people ought to be subject, as to the Lord Jesus Christ Himself.' Again: 'Every power, or art, or virtue, to which the ultimate end belongs, must dispose of all things which relate to that end. But carnal wars against a faithful people must be referred to spiritual and divine good as their end, of which the clergy are the appointed judges.'

No. XX.

We have seen that the power and authority of the Popes was over the princes and governments of Christendom, and that they rebuked sovereigns and peoples when they were guilty of crime. For the Supreme Pontiff declares, as a judge, the law of God, which is over all. It is our Lord who is the ruler of the world, and it is His law which is over all; and the Supreme Pontiff is His Viceregent on earth. That the supremacy of the Pontiffs was a great blessing to mankind has been acknowledged by Protestants.

Speaking of those times, Wheaton says:

'The influence of the Papal authority, though sometimes abused, was then felt as a blessing to mankind: it rescued Europe from total barbarism; it afforded the only asylum and shelter from feudal oppression.'*

And the Rev. John Lord, in his introductory essay to the *Chronicles of Sir John Froissart*, writes:

'Moreover, the Papacy was a great central power, needed to control the princes of Europe, and settle the difficulties which arose between them. The Popes, whatever may have been their personal character, were conservators of the peace. They preserved unity amid anarchy, and restrained the impulses of passionate kings. Again, the Papacy, in the best ages, is thought by many

* Wheaton's *History of the Law of Nations*, 33.

profound historians to have been democratic in its sympathies. It guarded the interests of the people; it preserved them from the violence of their oppressors; it furnished a retreat, in monasteries, for the contemplative, the suffering, the afflicted, and the poor.'

The philosopher Leibnitz has written these words:

'The arguments of Bellarmine—which prove from the position that the Popes have a jurisdiction in spirituals, that they also have a jurisdiction, at least indirect, over temporal things—appeared cogent even to Hobbes. . . . . It matters little whether the Popes had this primacy by right divine or by a human right, so long as it is established that, during many centuries, they exercised a very extended power throughout the West, not only with universal consent, but with universal approbation. There are many Protestants even who have thought that it would be well still to leave this power in the hands of the Pope, and that it would prove useful in reforming abuses, &c.'* It is no wonder that Leibnitz added (*Opera*, tom. v. p. 65): 'I am of opinion that there should be established, at Rome itself, a high tribunal for judging the quarrels of princes; and that the Pope should be the president of it.' Although a Protestant, yet Leibnitz had the intellect to see that much; and the courage to confess it.

The interests of mankind do indeed demand that there should be a power to restrain rulers and protect the people from oppression and wrong; and to put a bridle on those passions of the populace which are the sure destruction of nations. The only check or bridle for a populace is the authority of God's law, in the hands of the temporal Head of Christ's Church.

* Leibnitz, *Opera*, tom. iv. pars iii.

Count Joseph de Maistre asserts in the most emphatic manner:*

'We find that the Popes did effectively repress monarchs and protect the people; they allayed quarrels by a prudent intervention; they admonished sovereigns and subjects of their duties; and they struck with anathemas those great crimes which they found themselves unable to prevent.'

Leibnitz observed that even the Emperor Frederick acknowledged the authority of the Pope over kings, referring that supremacy to a divine origin, when he succumbed to Pope Alexander III., saying, 'Not to you, but to St. Peter.' For, in the Middle Ages even, those sovereigns who were struck with anathema never disputed the power itself, but only the justice of its particular application in their own case. One fact, indeed, is very clear throughout the whole history of that period—all the sovereigns of Christendom regarded the Pope as their superior; they looked upon all Christian kingdoms as united, by the fraternity of the Christian religion, in a universal commonwealth, under the supremacy of the head of the spiritual power, who was ruled by God alone, and limited only by God's law, and who existed to enforce that law.

Another fact is clear: that kings and nations, whatever they may have done, yet acknowledged it to be wrong for any one to take the law into his own hands and enforce justice in his own case. To this fact Pascal bore testimony in his *Lettres Provinciales:* 'The Church forbids her children, much more strongly than civil laws can forbid them, to enforce justice for themselves; and it is in the spirit of the Church that every Christian

* *Du Pape*, lib. ii. *Œuvres*, p. 371.

code forbids this, even in the case of high treason, and places the criminal in the hands of judges, to try him and punish him according to the law and the proper forms of justice.'

Another truth looms through the mazes of the history of every nation: as long as sovereigns repudiated the supreme power of judging, so long the subjects regarded their kings as inviolable. But when there was no longer any appeal from the highest of the king's courts to an impartial judge, whose judgment was without appeal, then the only resource of injured subjects was revolt, and the terrible exertion of their physical force. 'Government alone can never govern.' Without the supremacy of religion, of God's law, of Christ's institution, the only resource of governments who are not obeyed is physical force. And yet physical force is generally found to be on the side of the people.

A fourth truth even Protestant historians have confessed: That the character of the Middle Ages consisted in the application of Christian principles to every portion of human life—to private life, to domestic life, to municipal life, to political or civil life, to international life, or to the comity of nations. In this world-wide or Catholic system of relations, we see the Pope as arbitrator between states, as supreme judge of political acts, as the common father of all Christians, as the source of order throughout the world. The Bishops guided the home policy in each nation, and ruled in the municipal affairs of their sees; and they became venerated for their cultivated intelligence, their disciplined minds, their learning and goodness. By these qualities they everywhere acquired great political and social influence. In smaller spheres the Priests

naturally gained, from the same causes, a similar influence in their respective parishes. Public right was moreover embodied in canon law, expounded by jurists of the Church, and asserted, in the last resort, by the Pope. As a consequence of this state of things calmness and vigour of mind was generally found in the people, together with liberty and a feeling of security arising from a sense of law; except in those times when this system was broken through, there was peace between nations, and small expenditure by governments. For these are the necessary results of that social order and of those habits of thought which revolutionists and rationalists have for so long laboured to destroy.

As our intention is, at a future time to work down to the root of the question, and thus, if possible, to arrive at the bare first principles of all Christian politics, we shall now give, as the sum of what has preceded, and as the text of what is to follow, an extract from a despatch of Cardinal Antonelli to the Nuncio accredited to the Emperor Napoleon III., dated Rome, March 19, 1870:

'The arguments advanced in this projected Constitution [of the Vatican Council] and in the subjoined canons . . . do no more than expound the maxims and fundamental principles of the Church—principles which have been many times reiterated in the acts of preceding general councils, and enunciated and developed in similar Pontifical Constitutions which have been published in all Catholic states of the world; more especially can this be said of those celebrated dogmatic Bulls, "*Unigenitus*" and "*Auctorem Fidei*," wherein the above-mentioned doctrines have been con-

firmed and sanctioned—principles, in fine, which have always formed the bases of the teaching of the Church in all ages, and of all Catholic schools—principles which have the support of an innumerable number of ecclesiastical writers whose works are used as text-books in the public lyceums under secular governments, and which, so far from having been gainsaid by the civil authorities, have always been mentioned with approbation and encouragement. . . . . The Church never did understand, and does not understand, that she should exercise any direct and absolute power over the political rights of the state. The Church, having received from God the high mission of directing men, whether individually or as constituted together in a society, towards a supernatural end, received thereby not only the authority but also the duty to judge of the morality and justice of all their acts, whether domestic or foreign, in respect of their conformity to law, natural and divine. And as no action—whether commanded by a sovereign power as means to some political end, or voluntarily committed by an individual—can escape the character of morality and justice, so it comes to be that the judgment of the Church, although directly touching the morality of those acts, yet indirectly extends to the acts themselves which are affected with that moral character. This, however, is not the same thing as a direct meddling in the political affairs, which (according to God's established order and the teaching of the Church) belong to the temporal power, independently of any other authority. For the secular power is subordinate to the religious power, in the same sense that the empire is below the priesthood by reason of the inferiority of the end of the former to that of the

latter; so that the authority of the empire depends on the sacerdotal authority, as human things depend on divine things, and as temporal things on spiritual. And if temporal happiness, which is the end and aim of the civil power, is subordinate to eternal happiness, which is the spiritual end of the priesthood, then we must say the same concerning the scope in which they are severally exercised;—we must say that the one power is subordinate to the other, and that the faculties of the one are subordinate to those of the other, just as the ends to which they are directed are subordinate the one to the other.'

To this we must append part of a brief addressed by Pope Gelasius I. to the Emperor Anastasius:

'There are two powers which govern the world,—the authority of the Pontiffs and the regal power. Although you command in temporal things, yet you ought to submit to the ministers of God in all spiritual things. Since Bishops submit to the laws which you make touching temporal things, because they acknowledge you to have received from God the sovereignty over the empire, with what affection should not you render obedience to those who have been appointed to the ministration of the Holy Mysteries.'

A DEFENCE OF THE COMMUNE.

To the Editor of the TABLET.

August 26th, 1871.

SIR,—As you have devoted a series of articles to an attack upon the Commune, your sense of justice will compel you to admit a reply from an active member of the great and ancient International Society. Editors of the 'first-class daily papers' have also attacked us; but there is not in them the same motive to admit our defence into their columns. They pretend to ignore the unanswerable arguments which we have so often advanced in our own behalf. It was prudent in them, perhaps, to take this course. For he who feigns an ignorance of what he knows, often gains a reputation for knowing a multitude of things of which he is ignorant; while the studied amphibologies of those newspaper writers enable them to write about that multitude of things without revealing their ignorance of the subjects concerning which they write. In Voltaire's dialogues, the Capon said of men, that 'They use thought to sanction their injustice, and employ words to disguise their thoughts.' Of the writers who attack the International and the Commune with one hand, while they make still fiercer onslaughts on your Church and religion

with the other, I may say (and perhaps you will agree with me) that 'They use thought to sanction their injustice and falsehoods, and employ a torrent of ambiguous words to disguise their ignorance and veil their contradictions.' Yet I do not blame them. A journal which attempts to furnish its readers with truth and sense will, in this fickle generation, be sunk with their weight. Every newspaper must tickle its *clientèle* with straws, if it would sail triumphant on the tide of popular favour. In the shipwreck of a state only trifles float, while weighter and more valuable matters sink to the bottom and are never more seen. But I must turn from the journals, to offer to you that defence of the International and the Commune which they will not receive.

The International Society is a confraternity of all the workmen in the world; and the Commune is the only means to obviate the despotism of parliamentary majorities, under which every country has been groaning since the introduction of that compromise with the Revolution called 'Liberalism.' The International has been formed on Freemasonry, which kings and princes of the blood royal have always been so fond of patronising. Like Freemasonry, it has the virtue of being cosmopolitan, and has purged itself of the mean prejudices of nationality and patriotism. The International is, in fact, no more than an honest and unflinching assertion of the principles of 1789, on which Parliaments and Governments have lavished their encomiums, but to which they have played false, by stopping short at the compromise to which I have alluded. It is, therefore, not just in those who have accepted the principles of '89 to charge us with aiming at 'the destruction of the

present society,'—namely, of that hypocrisy called Liberalism,—'and the reconstruction of society upon a new basis.' For all that we desire is to carry out loyally the principles which they and we have accepted. Our very origin was the creation of Liberal governments. The idea of our society sprang from that plaything of kings, the Universal Exhibition of 1862, which confederated all nations in a unity of organism, and was therefore supposed to inaugurate an era of lasting and real peace for the world.

What is the accusation which has been brought against us? The *Times*, quoting a certain 'Frederic Harrison,' says that we do not 'believe in any God, nor in any man;' that 'their [our] philosophy is atheism, materialism, the negation of all religion; their political programme is absolute individual liberty, by means of the suppression of government and the division of nationalities into communes more or less federated. Their political economy consists essentially in the dispossession, with compensation, of the present holders of capital, and in assigning the coin, instruments of labour, and land, to associations of workmen; their historical theory is that the nobility and *bourgeoisie* have each had their reign, and that the turn of the proletariate has now come, &c.' This is unfairly expressed, but substantially true. I quote it because I will show that it is all strictly in accordance with those very principles which the *Times* has systematically enforced, but which you, sir, I confess, have consistently impugned. M. Jules Favre has attacked us in a state paper. In doing so he has contradicted his own principles, and cut from under his feet the very ground upon which he stood. The cause of Jules Favre's de-

mission, from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, is now no secret. I shall be violating no confidence in repeating that which the *Augsburg Gazette* has published in regard to the great Socialist meeting, when Mr. Bebel was elected president, and when Mr. Liebknecht (in speaking of the International and the Commune) very truly stated that M. Jules Favre was forced, by our society, to retire from his post, because he had calumniated it in that state paper, and had unmasked himself and proved himself to have been false to us, and to have been at one with M. Thiers, who aimed merely at injuring us; and to have been as bad as the Prussians, who urged us on and supplied us with arms, and induced our brethren to enter Paris under false pretences, while, on the other hand, those very Prussians gave M. Thiers facilities for destroying us. The attack of M. Jules Favre cannot, therefore, have weight against us; but I will quote it against himself. For if he had been true to his principles, he would have been a friend to us. Well, he says that our 'basis is atheism and communism; and our aim, the destruction of capital and the ruin of those who possess it; and our means, the material force of numbers;' and that our 'rule of conduct is the negation of all the principles upon which civil society rests;' and that we demand 'legislation for the people and directly by the people,' and 'communal or collective rights in the soil,' and 'the abolition of all national worship, and the substitution of science for faith, and human justice for divine right, and the abolition of marriage;' and 'that we seek to drive from our hearts both God and the idea of family;' and that, as we 'assist to ruin morality, we endanger the prosperity of peoples.' Now, I ask whether

it is fair in society, as represented by the *Times* and M. Jules Favre, to express such a horror of the International and of her child the Commune, when we are merely carrying out their own principles? 'We want to get rid of God,' they say! But society has every year been putting God farther off. 'We are atheistical,' indeed! But society has for more than half a century been busy sowing the seeds of atheism; legislation has become more and more atheistical; secular education has everywhere been established by law; God, and even justice itself, have been cast out of all international relations, and never appealed to in diplomatic despatches. 'We desire to abolish marriage,' forsooth! But society, both here and elsewhere, has, for more than three hundred years, regarded marriage as no sacrament, and proclaimed that it is no more than a civil contract, which may readily be dissolved on sufficient grounds of mutual convenience. Why charge us then with these indictments? We assert with honesty, and not in your mealy-mouthed fashion, those doctrines which are in accordance with our modern civilisation and progress, and which rest on the teachings of our own understanding, and not on the authority of a faith of eighteen centuries ago—doctrines, I say, which have been daily reiterated in every Legislative Assembly, in newspapers, in books, and in the conversations of the drawing-room. The only difference between us and them is that we, as might have been expected of working-men, are honest and blunt, and go straight to our point: while our accusers insist upon the same principles in some very misty and ambiguous language, and are afraid of acting up to what they say. We are logical; they announce their major and minor propositions, and then boggle at the conclu-

sion. We are—we do not deny it—the outcome of the Revolution, and the necessary and legitimate development of Liberalism. The middle class, by adopting Liberalism, put themselves over the higher class (who, after all, are far more generous and open-minded than the middle class, and who, till lately, have been consistent, however much we differ from them). What do the Internationalists do? We merely put ourselves, the working class, above the middle class; and we do so in virtue of the same Liberal principles which are professed by the capitalist middle class. This is what is called the 'overturning of society' by the International. The middle class, with their Liberalism, turned it half over; and we merely give another little push, and complete the work. If it was right for one class to change the order of the world, and put itself above all, then it is right for us to do the same. The middle class, and the middle-class Parliaments, and Liberal governments, made revolutions in the name of the people; and we ask: 'Who are the people, if not the great majority—the working-class or *prolétaires?*' They established the great principle of the sovereignty of the people; and we, the people, claim to be sovereign. They said that all power springs from the people, and should be exercised by them; and we choose to exercise it directly, and will not part with it for that invention of a 'representative system,' which is merely an excuse for robbing us of our inherent right and legitimate power. The 'Liberals' say that all men are and must be equal; and we therefore abolish inheritance and primogeniture, and everything else which tends to make men unequal; we are consistent when we say that all men are equally sons of the same great mother, *La Madre Natura*, as

our Italian brothers say. The 'Liberals' have denied the basis of all authority, in denying the authority of the Church (in which we entirely agree), and always appeal to a vote of the majority to determine what is right; and we proclaim that there is no authority over any man except his reason,—that neither Church, nor Kings, nor Parliament, has any authority: we therefore assert the rights of the minority, and establish a federation of numberless Communes. They asserted the 'principles of '89;' and cried for Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, but never intended to carry them out; we carry them out without talking about them so much. We aim at liberty, and therefore get rid of institutions, and customs, and bonds of marriage and of family, and votes of Parliament, and of every other restraint and bridle on our individual wills. We aim at a brotherhood, and therefore regard all men as sprung from one mother; and we deny all selfish interests, such as patriotism, nationality, and so forth. We aim at equality, and therefore we abolish every distinction and privilege, even to the possession of property: and we call this the apotheosis of labour, where there are no drones, but all must work; where all are equal and in the same circumstances and with the same duties. What right, then, have the 'Liberals' to attack us? Nay, how can any one in these days attack us, except those unenlightened persons who, like you, sir, uphold the authority of the Pope? Kings long ago and ever since have denied the authority of the Pope and the Church; this they did on our principles. So also the *bourgeoisie* dethroned kings, on our principles, and insisted on governing the nation; and so now the working classes intend, on the same principles, to oust the middle

classes, and deny the authority of Parliament. In France the Committee of the Assembly has acknowledged that we have merely carried out their own principles. Although their report is not correct in some points, yet I quote it, as it will bear out what I say: 'If it be true that secret societies were encouraged for political purposes which could not be avowed; if it be true that, in consequence of public instruction being intrusted to open professors of materialistic theories, religious feeling, and the belief which alone renders sacrifice and resignation possible, became weakened; if it be true that the worship of material pleasures had degraded characters and weakened intellects; if it be true that the questions which concern religion, the family, morals, and even the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, were abandoned to the sarcasms of a licentious press on the sole condition that it left Cæsar and his policy alone, then the Commission of Inquiry would have a right to point to all this as one of the principal causes of our defeat in war and of the horrible struggle which followed.

'Do not our literature, our arts, our theatres, for a long time past, indicate a society in its decadence? Have not moral principles, as well as religious beliefs, been the object of incessant attacks, all the more serious that they came from those in high place, and assumed the outward form of respect? Have we not too often glorified the spirit of revolt, and professed the doctrine that Might took precedence of Right—that in politics, necessity or reasons of state were a sufficient excuse for odious spoliations?

'Our attention has been directed to the weakening of the religious sentiment as one of the principal causes

of the strange disease which undermines our social state. The great law of respect for authority and for social superiority has disappeared. The family itself has been vitiated at its source, and the father has lost part of his legitimate authority. Public instruction has, perhaps, been too much confined to teaching as distinguished from education. It has ceased to form men. Men are what we most want in our time; in every line of life gaps appear which are not filled up. "A good education," said Leibnitz, "is the first foundation of human happiness." In our present misfortunes many great minds believe that this foundation has been wanting. To a society fundamentally sceptical, and externally become almost pagan, the International has preached atheism; to a society greedy of material enjoyment, it has preached the nothingness of eternal hopes and the exclusive worship of interest; who can be surprised that it has succeeded so completely? God forbid that we should pretend to measure out to each his share of responsibility, but you will have to inquire how much is to be imputed to philosophical and political programmes. Have we not all more or less adopted in our practice the motto of the International—"Civilisation is the greatest possible amount of happiness and well-being."'

If you English people were honest, you would make a report to the same effect, and your middle class would not attack us for carrying out their principles. At all events, we shall shortly depose the middle class from their power, and it will be a consolation to them in their last moments to reflect upon the benefits which they will confer upon the nation by ending their reign. The 'progress' they have so often cried for shall now

be given them, against their will. The equality which they have called for so loudly shall be thrust upon them. They will assuredly rejoice to know that the liberty, and even the license which they enjoyed, to the detriment of the few above them and of the many below, will at last be extended to the great mass of working men. The fraternity they desired shall be brought about, and, in striking the horny hands of their labourers, they may weep tears of joy as they call them, with some truth, and perhaps with much reluctance, 'their own flesh and blood,' and salute them with the endearing term of 'brothers.' At last they will be true Liberals, for, by the compulsory abandonment of their political supremacy, they will liberate their country from a galling tyranny, and from a bondage both oppressive and ignominious. The laws, which their parliamentary majorities have made, will be swept into the dust-bin, and give place to the justice which they hypocritically professed, and to the local self-government which they have always thwarted.

To the last of middle-class Parliaments I will address the words of Shippen: 'If there are in this new Parliament any men devoted to their private interest, and who prefer the gratification of their passions to the safety and happiness of their country; who can riot without remorse in the taxation of their constituents; who can forget the anguish of guilt in the noise of a feast, the pomp of a drawing-room, or the glare of an equipage; and think expensive wickedness and the gaieties of folly equivalent to the fair fame of fidelity and the peace of virtue,—to these I shall speak to no purpose.' To the present Parliament I shall indeed speak to no purpose.

One word more in conclusion. These inconsistent Liberals, with pale and quivering lips, ask: 'How are we to stop this irruption of barbarians?' How, indeed! By force you cannot; for force is on the side of numbers. Besides, what is physical force against an absorbing idea? 'For it is, as the air, invulnerable, and your vain blows malicious mockery.' Jules Favre confesses that force is useless, and tells you to seek a moral change. But to produce a moral change you must have a moral power, and a more potent idea than that which you have to combat. Here we may laugh you to scorn; for there is no idea half so potent as that which you yourselves have been humbugged into destroying, by means of your rationalism; that idea which you yourselves have mutilated, by adopting our principle of separating morality from religion, and eliminating Christianity from politics. There is no idea so potent as that one which you have well-nigh killed out of this country—I mean the Church; that Church which has indeed stood the storms of eighteen centuries, and whose principle it has ever been to combat 'the world, the flesh, and the devil,' which are our and your best allies; that Church which now has undertaken an internecine war against your own principles—the principles of '89. That is the only idea we Communists had to fear; and you have released us from that fear. For you never had but two courses to choose from: you had either to join heart and hand with us, or else to retrace your steps, and submit to the Church, and to the Ruler whom the Church has declared to be infallible; and I say that you cannot now retrace your steps, for you have well-nigh cut off your retreat. There is nothing left for the Liberals, then, but to become

Communists, and enter into the cause with as much ardour as we did in Paris.

I remain your obedient servant,

RORY OF THE HILL.

THE END.

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